

“Strike Hard” Campaign

China’s crackdown on political dissidence

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Foreword

The People's Republic of China (PRC) initiated the "Strike-Hard" Campaign in China in 1983. It is a unique campaign which demonstrates China's hard-line approach against the exercise of fundamental human rights. The campaign left huge scars on its people and it dramatizes China's image of an oppressive and ruthless state. The "Strike Hard" campaign drew huge criticism from the international community, especially from human rights groups. The campaign initially meant to be an iron-fisted crackdown on growing crime in China, however evolved to become a tool of political oppression.

In Tibet, the "Strike-Hard" campaign was introduced only in 1996. It had a singular political aim – to stifle political dissent. This began an era of more violence, pain and suffering for the Tibetan people. The high handedness of the police and authorities, impunity, lack of transparency and accountability resulted in ill treatment, torture and many deaths. The People's Republic of China and its Tibetan surrogates abused fundamental human rights and destroyed people's lives.

At the time of writing this report, China Tibet Information Center (www.tibetinfo.com) reported that the "Strike Hard" Campaign for the winter (1 November to 30 December 2004) had been launched in Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). (www.tchrd.org; TCHRD press release, 8 November 2004).

China has come a long way. Today's Beijing boasts of great progress in its human rights record. Aware of its growing power and influence, it has smugly entered the international scene. The fact remains that it is the only communist authoritarian regime in the world that has done little to initiate any real progression in democracy and respect for human rights.

The following report - *Strike Hard Campaign: China's crackdown on political dissidence* is warranted by the relative thinness of literature on the subject and by its notorious repression of the human and political rights of the people of China and Tibet. Considering China's

sophisticated use of human rights diplomacy and, its defense of its policies that violate human rights as an “internal matter”, it has become difficult for the international community to promote and protect human rights in China and Tibet. In short, any examination of China’s human rights record must take into account the use of the Strike-Hard Campaign.

Chapter 1

Introduction

In 1983 China launched a domestic campaign called ‘YANDA’ which is translated in English as ‘STRIKE HARD’.

It means:

To Impose Three Extremes of:

- 1 Forceful Crackdown
- 2 The Severest of Capital Punishment
- 3 The Swiftest of Execution

This report explains the “Strike Hard” campaign in China; its origin, course and evolution. It examines the human rights violations that took place under the campaign in China and Tibet, the impact of the campaign on the Tibetan people, and domestic and international reaction to the campaign. The report also seeks to critically explore whether the authorities in the end achieved the agenda of the campaign.

“Strike Hard” was at first meant to be a campaign against crimes. The campaign is mostly interpreted and explained in association with the criminal law. The legal aspects of “Strike Hard” campaign are sourced from the criminal law as indicated below:

Section 1. Crimes and Criminal responsibility.

Section 2. Preparation for a Crime, Criminal Attempt and Discontinuation of a Crime.

Section 3. Joint Crimes Special provisions

(Chapter I) Crimes of Endangering National Security and

(Chapter II) Crimes of Endangering Public Security.¹

Under the campaign several thousands of criminal and political prisoners were executed and much more than what is officially stated

by the Chinese authorities and the figures available to human rights watchdogs. The PRC launched the campaign in 1983 with the aim of wiping out crimes in Chinese society. The 1996 campaign in Tibet was aimed to curb “splittist” activities (term coined by the Chinese indicating activities meant to break away from the Motherland), particularly in monasteries and nunneries, which were the traditional bastion of political dissidence. In 2001 the campaign was re-launched for the third time. This time to fight the corruption within the Communist Party but again in Tibet and Xinjiang it remained a tool to suppress political dissent.

However, the re-launch of 2001 took its twist in the tale. After 9/11 when America launched its ‘War on Terror,’ China too launched its version of ‘War on Terror’. However, China came under severe criticism from United States and other countries for misusing the ‘War on Terror’ particularly in Xinjiang where the “Strike Hard” campaign led to gross human rights violations.

China’s ‘War on Terror’ had its spill-over in Tibet as well. In April 2002, two Tibetans (Trulku Tenzin Delek and Lobsang Dhondup) were arrested from Sichuan Province on charges of terrorist acts. This marked the first time ‘terrorist’ charges had been brought against Tibetans. Both men were given death sentences on 2 December 2002, followed by the swift execution of Lobsang Dhondup on 26 January 2003. Trulku Tenzin Delek was given an extension of the death sentence with a two year reprieve.

The Campaign

The “Strike Hard’ Campaign took on different manners of implementation depending on the needs and requirement of the particular region. Various campaigns under the banner of “Strike Hard” were launched at the same time. In some cases within one region different campaigns were launched with varying objectives. There was a “Strike Hard” Campaign against “splittist activities” in Lhasa city and robbery in another region. The “Strike Hard” campaigns were launched at the national level, within a city and at local regions against specified crime or target. The verdicts were issued swiftly and decisively and therefore it was often dubbed as China’s ‘execution frenzy’.

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In Tibet many historical events preceded the launch of the “Strike Hard” campaign. First, was the accession of Tibet under China in 1959, followed by number of pro-independence protests and resistance movements in Tibet. In the nearly five decades of China’s rule over Tibet there are clear patterns that suggest China’s attempt as well as measures to keep Tibet under its authority. It was formerly Mao’s era of sinister ‘barrel of gun’² followed by Deng’s³ liberal policies in Tibet to address the popular discontent among the Tibetans till the popular outbreak of protests on 20 September 1987, 1 October 1988 and 5 March 1989. The uprisings heralded the advent of stringent policies in Tibet that tainted China’s international image and standing in the global arena such as the imposition of Martial Law in 1989 under “Tibet Autonomous Region” (TAR) Party Secretary Hu Jintao, currently the President of China. Three months after the Uprisings in Tibet came the protest of students at Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989, which ended in the massacre of the students.

The events of 1987, 1988 and 1989 unrest in Tibet and later at Tiananmen Square presented serious threat to the Central Communist Party leadership. Thereafter the Party’s efforts to tighten their grip on power resulted in hard line policies both in Tibet and in China. The Party relied upon hard measures of ‘zero tolerance’ in anticipation of unexpected events that might threaten national stability. The “Strike Hard” Campaigns of 1996 and 2001 were manifestation of this intention.

The “Strike Hard” campaign of 1983 and 1996 were withdrawn however, the campaign of 2001 continues today. There is no denying of the truth that several thousands of political and criminal prisoners were executed under the campaign without fair trial and denial of various fundamental human rights. China came under the close scrutiny of many human rights watchdogs and has been regarded as the principal country with appalling human rights record. This paper is to highlight the true account of gross violations of human rights under the “Strike Hard” campaign.

There are some similarities between the campaign of 1983 and 1996. As it was in 1983, the vast majority of prisoners were sentenced to death immediately after the summary trials.⁴ In such a swift manner

of judicial procedure it was quite unlikely that the convicted prisoners have a fair trial as well as measures to defend themselves. Though China does have a judiciary, which is claimed to be independent and fair, yet very often judiciary have to adhere and follow the instructions given in the official media. The slogans were part of campaigns in China and the Chinese judiciary was expected to adhere them. On 10 May 1996 Tibet High Peoples Court called on courts at various levels to speed up proceedings of various criminal offences without any discrimination about the social orders in the struggle against the serious crimes.

“Severe and speedy punishment is a major slogan of the campaign. In an article on the launch of the campaign on 29 April 1996, the Party newspaper ‘Peoples Daily’ called on judicial and public security personnel to seriously adhere to the principle of severely and quickly punishing criminals (See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter SWB) of 30 April 1996, FE/2599 G/5). An editorial in the same newspaper on 15 May reiterated the need to firmly implement the severe and speedy punishment policy and to work hard to achieve the goal of quick approvals of arrests, quick prosecutions and quick trials. The editorial went on to state that whoever deserves the death penalty according to law must be sentenced to death (See SWB, 17 May 1996, FE/2614 G/9.)”⁵

Law Amendments

The call to severe and speedy punishment under criminal law was introduced in 1983. This law granted the judiciary the power for summary trials and executions. In March 1996, National People’s Congress amended the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) in which the 1983 decision concerning the Rapid Adjudication of cases involving criminal elements that seriously endangered public security was repealed. However, this ammendment did not last long. The CPL was once again revised in January 1997. The revision of the law once again called for the speeding up of the procedures for trial, appeal and approval of death sentences for offenders who seriously endangered the public security.

As a result of such official ammendments the executions took place within few days after a brief summary trials. In Jilin province for example three men were arrested for robbing a car loaded with

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bank notes on 24 May 1996 and on the 27 May after three days they were sentenced to death at an open meeting. The alleged convicts appealed to the provincial higher court but were rejected on 28 May. The three men were executed by a firing squad on 31 May. (Jilin Daily of 1 and 6 June 1996).

The campaign was hit across entire China and the scope of adverse impact on human rights situation was great.

“In the first two months of the Strike Hard nationwide anti-crime campaign launched on 28 April 1996, Amnesty International recorded from published accounts over 1,000 death sentences, most of which were executed. These figures are believed to represent only a fraction of the actual number of death sentences and executions within the 115,759 sentences imposed since April 1996. Severe and speedy punishment under the law is a major slogan for the campaign, and refers to legislation which has been in force since it was passed for a very similar nationwide anti-crime campaign in 1983. The 1983 legislation speeds up procedures for trial, appeal and approval of death sentences for offenders who seriously endanger public security. Under it, defendants can be tried without warning, without being given a copy of the indictment in advance and without notification of the trial being given to all parties concerned. As a result defendants have faced summary justice, some being executed only days after the crime was allegedly committed.”

Amnesty International raised serious concerns on the nature of legislation and its adverse impacts on the general human rights situation in China as well as in the autonomous regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet. Amnesty reported⁶

“Under this legislation, defendants can be tried without warning, without being given a copy of the indictment in advance and without notification of the trial being given to all parties concerned. This means, among other things, that defendants can be tried without the assistance of a lawyer and without knowing exactly what accusations they face until their trial. The 1983 legislation also allows the provincial high courts - rather than the Supreme Peoples Court - to approve death sentences passed by lower courts, so that, in many cases, death sentences are confirmed by the high courts immediately after sentencing, and executions carried out straight after.”

Role of Official Media

Another aspect of the campaign is the participation of the official media. The official media in 1983 played a huge role in ‘promotion’ and ‘propaganda’ of the campaign. It was the professed objectives of the campaign to discourage the people into entering or committing criminal activities. The executions and trials of the cases were widely publicized by the official media. It was understood that official media were the mouthpiece of the authorities. The media came out with new slogans and praising the police and judiciary for implementing the campaign and protecting security of the people. TV station telecast the executions “live”, the periodicals promoted and explained the slogans and calls of the senior party leaders. The radio stations broadcast the executions of the convicted criminals. Often the official radios would ask people to be present at the firing squads in order to witness the executions.

The earliest reported participation of official media in 1996 was the Beijing newspaper. The newspaper on 26 May 1996 stressed the need to use the 1983 legislation to pass either heavy sentences or death penalties on serious criminal offenders. The same feeling was broadcast by official radio on 20 June 1996. A month earlier the official newspaper Xinhua on 29 April 1996 also called on “*judicial and public security personnel to seriously adhere to the principle of severely and quickly punishing the criminals.*”⁷

Amnesty International reported the role of official media as an agent of government in promotion of the campaign. The official media played the role of moral teachers in shaping and influencing the public opinion of the campaign against criminal activities. The media also boosted the morale of police task force and legal officials in undertaking the campaign.

“Intensive, and at times near hysterical, propaganda has been carried out by the state media, with daily exhortations to deal a fatal blow on criminals so as to win a complete victory in the strike hard crackdown. On 30 May 1996, the Chinese central radio stated in one such broadcast: the crackdown shows that in this divine land of ours, all lawless and criminal acts... will be severely punished before the sword of law that our republic holds high, The radio report claimed that the masses had shown an enthusiasm for the campaign such as

had not been seen in years. It added: Let us continue to work hard... so that we can win a complete victory in the crackdown and our laws will shine in this sprawling divine land or ours. Central Broadcasting station, Beijing, 30 May 1996, SWB 4 June 1996, FE 2629 G/7”⁸

Role of Judiciary

However, it was quite apparent the launching of these types of campaign was never easy from the legal point of view. It is believed that the Chinese judges had a number of meetings over the matters. There was promotional support from the party mouthpiece such as People’s Daily and Xinhua.

“In fact, many judicial and administrative measures have also been introduced to effect a better public security environment. The Supreme Court is mulling over rules to set up juvenile courts across the country to better protect, educate and reform minor perpetrators, as minors are becoming an ever-growing part of the country’s offenders. Central and local governments are investing more in remote mountainous areas to prevent farmers there from growing opium. The Ministry of Justice is stepping up efforts to rectify prison management for effective reform of inmates and to reduce their recidivism rate.”⁹

The Campaign in many ways repeated the features of Cultural Revolution i.e. mass parades, rallies and executions. In this campaign there were numerous rallies and public meetings in cities and towns to achieve a fast and dramatic results of the campaign. Hence the rallies were in strict sense a ‘deterrent exercise’ to the public. When a rally was announced it was mandatory for the government employees to attend. If a rally was held at particular region, the people of that locality must also participate. These were the requirements of the campaign. The parades and rallies often seemed like the enactment of the political dramas of Cultural Revolution era. Amnesty International reported one such in Hubei and Gansu Province.

“Numerous examples of summary justice have been given by the state media. In many places courts have held public trials to pronounce death sentences which were followed by immediate executions. In some areas, local courts have held such trials jointly. In Gansu province, for example, the Lanzhou city intermediate peoples court and the Lanzhou railway transportation intermediate court held a joint open

trial on 16 May at which 14 people were sentenced to death and then taken for immediate execution by firing squad. Gansu Daily of 17 May 1996, in SWB, 12 June 1996, FE 2632 G/3.

“In Shanghai, the No.1 and No.2 municipal intermediate courts, together with courts from three other districts, held public meetings on 26 May to pronounce judgement in a number of criminal cases, including those of two men who were sentenced to death and then taken away to be executed immediately. Shanghai radio on 27 May 1996, in SWB, 12 June 1996.”¹⁰

“Amnesty International is particularly concerned that the political authorities have instructed the judiciary to speed up procedures to sentence offenders, including those liable to the death penalty. This may result in many miscarriages of justice. The organisation is also concerned that the pressure put upon the police and judiciary to crack cases and speed up prosecutions may result in increased use of torture to force confessions. Tens of thousands of criminal suspects have been arrested since the start of the campaign.”

Success?

The “Strike Hard” campaign of 1996 lasted for four months from 28 April to 31 July 1996. In assessment the campaign drew different version of results. To the Chinese authorities it was by far a successful campaign. But to many rights groups the campaign was seen as a violation of many fundamental human rights, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet. On the propaganda front it was a successful campaign while the ground realities showed a different picture of the Chinese society. Ren Jianxin the former President of Beijing’s Supreme Court said on 30 June 1996:

“the strike hard campaign had yielded unexpectedly good results, but was now entering its vital third phase. This would determine how long its achievements would last, he said. He called on local government and Communist Party officials across the country to strengthen their involvement in the campaign and step up propaganda aimed at mobilising the masses to fight crime.”¹¹

Execution Frenzy

However, to many of human rights groups the gross violation of

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human rights exceeded beyond their estimation. It is a widely held belief that actual figures of the prisoners executed under the campaign are not known. Amnesty concluded that

“The limited number of reports available so far shows that at least a thousand people have already been executed, but the real number is likely to be far higher. From 28 April until 27 June 1996, Amnesty International recorded 1,014 confirmed death sentences. Of these, over 800 were officially confirmed to have been immediately executed, and over 160 others are known to have been passed without a reprieve (In China, some death sentences are handed down with suspension of execution for two years, following which the case is reviewed to determine whether or not execution is carried out. Since the start of the strike hard campaign, however, Amnesty International has recorded only about two dozen cases in which death sentences with a two-year reprieve were passed.) and for types of crimes where the execution is invariably carried out shortly or immediately after the sentence is publicly announced.”¹²

However, the figures cited above are based on the limited number of reports available to Amnesty International, it is also believed by human rights watchdogs that figures only represent a fraction of actual numbers of death sentences and executions. Amnesty International believed a real statistics of executions carried out so far in campaign is far more than 1000 cases it has recorded.

The former Chinese President Jiang Zemin defended the campaign during the 1996 re-launch said on November 28 1997¹³ *“Freedom of speech and expression is totally different from the attempt or deliberate attempt to create chaos, endangering the safety of government operation”*.

Despite the success of 1996 campaign, crime loomed back again and gradually reached a peak in 1998. China faced another period of social insecurity and then the “Strike Hard” Campaign proved a failure for the second time. The need of another launch was felt and discussed widely among many criminologists in China. The launch of “Strike Hard” campaign for the third time loomed very imminent. The launch of the 2001 “Strike Hard” campaign had finally begun.

Chapter 2

The “Strike Hard” Campaign of 1996

There are few known facts and records on the “Strike Hard” campaign of 1983. However, it is a well known truth that the “Strike Hard” campaign of 1983 was the fiercest crackdown on crime in China.

In early days, the campaign was used as a ‘genuine’ antidote to discourage people from indulging in criminal offences. It could be asked why the rampant crimes do not prevail before 1980s. Perhaps, at that time Mao’s China was headstrong in Cultural Revolution¹⁴ for ten long years (1967-1977). Even before the Cultural Revolution the rigid scene of economic equity among the masses may have left no room for the emergence of disadvantaged population and hence there was fewer criminal activities recorded.

The 1996 Campaign

It all seemed to start with Deng Xiaoping’s opening up of Chinese economy into the era of Liberalized Chinese Economy. The era also emphasized, “To be rich is a glory”. In Mao’s China this idea was totally shunned and forbidden. The fast and stupendous economic growth experienced in last two decades also produced some of the serious social ills and problems that are affecting Chinese society today. The Midas touch of newfound wealth was not distributed equally among the Chinese people. Particularly, the wealth was experienced only in the coastal port cities of China such as Shanghai and Guangdong. As one official expressed concerns on this new trend:

“The dramatic social change taking place in China is producing a growing disadvantaged population, he said, noting that this is likely to give rise to underground violent gangs engaging in illegal activities. Dealing with the social issue of a disadvantaged population will not be easy, just as in many other countries, including developed countries, Wang warned, but he pointed out that the Chinese government and academic circles have become fully aware of that”¹⁵.

The “Strike Hard” Campaign of 1996

Many criticisms poured in on this unequal share to which Deng famously replied, “*Allow some one to get richer first*”. Later the newfound wealth was accompanied by the growing social problems such as the rising crime rates, theft, homicides and mafia like activities of criminal gangs operating more often than ever before. The criminal activities undermined the social security and in the beginning of 1990s it rocketed to a new height. The Chinese authorities sensed an urgency to act quickly and decisively to curb the criminal activities.

1996 marked the beginning of yet another launch of “Strike Hard” Campaign. The former President Jiang Zemin made a call for ‘obvious progress’ of public order in the next two years. Then on 28 April 1996 a nation wide anti-crime campaign was launched.

“The anti-crime campaign - termed “Yanda” (“strike hard” or “severe crackdown”) - is primarily aimed at major crimes, such as murder and robbery, and criminal gangs. It has led to an unprecedented number of executions since 1983, when a similar nationwide anti-crime campaign resulted in thousands of summary executions in less than three months. The current campaign is being carried out in the same way as the 1983 campaign, with the state-run media fully mobilized to publicize arrests and executions on a daily basis, and to exort local leaders, police and the judiciary to “swiftly and severely” punish offenders targeted in the campaign.”¹⁶

There was a renewed urgency for the launch of campaign as study from the China Criminology Society revealed, “*According to official statistics (2001) crimes registered by police for investigation last year (2000) rose by 50 percent over 1999. Gang crimes with Mafia features handled by courts across the country went up seven times, with many involving high-ranking Party and government officials. And the number of explosions increased by 2.6 times over the past two decades (1983-2001).*”¹⁷

Chapter 3

The “Strike Hard” campaign of 2001

On 4 April 2001 China launched the third “Strike Hard” Campaign. The then President Jiang Zemin officially named it “Strike Hard and Rectification Drive.” He also called on law enforcement bodies through the People’s Daily 4 April 2001 to make “*obvious progress in public situation security in China in the next two years*”. He explained the objective of the Campaign as “*long term endeavour to achieve the ultimate goal of improving China’s public situation in the future.*”¹⁸

The crimes in China seemed to follow a certain pattern and trend. In early 1980s the crimes rose up after the opening up of Chinese economy by Deng Xiaoping. Then in the mid 1990s when Chinese economy entered a boom period and crime rose to an unprecedented scale. By the beginning of the 2000 era China was rocked by official corruption with the nexus of the tycoons and senior Party and Government officials. According to China, all three “Strike Hard” campaigns of 1983, 1996 and 2001 were a harsh response to the criminal activities of two decades.

In the beginning of 2000 criminal activities greatly increased and once again China faced a major explosion of crime. The activities of underworld mafias were rampant and looming large. Many experts said that the recent emergence of gang crimes and explosions are only “the tip of the iceberg”. On 4 June 2001 People’s Daily came out with this report.

“According to official statistics, crimes registered by police for investigation last year rose by 50 percent over 1999. Gang crimes with Mafia features handled by courts across the country went up seven times, with many involving high-ranking Party and government officials. And the number of explosions increased by 2.6 times over the past two decades.”

Researcher and criminologist Wang Dawie from the Criminology Society said “*All signs have indicated that China is at its fourth crime peak since 1983 when the country’s first ‘strike hard’ campaign was launched*”.

As per the existing crime situation in 2001, the “Strike Hard” campaign focused on three major kinds of crimes:

1. Gang crimes with mafia features
2. Violent felonies involving explosives
3. Man slaughter
4. Robbery, kidnapping and thefts

Months after the launch of the campaign an explosion rocked China’s northern city of Shijiazhuang in March 2001 killing around 108 people. Four suspects were arrested immediately and nine others believed to be involved were detained. Xiao Yang, the President of Supreme People’s Court said, “*The drive is not an expedient response to the recent series of explosions and other violent crimes, but a long-term endeavor to achieve the ultimate goal of improving China’s public order situation in the future.*”¹⁹

Launch by Top Leaders

Xiao Yang, the President of Supreme People’s Court in Beijing on 3 May 2001 called on courts to carry out a nationwide crackdown on gang crime and other economic and business related crimes. During the meeting attended by the Presidents of local courts he asked the courts to intensify the crackdowns on criminals to impress them about the importance of public safety. He specifically referred to gang crime, violent crime such as explosion, homicide, robbery, kidnapping and thefts. He also made a bold announcement that officials who try to shelter gangs or take part in crime will also receive severe punishment according to the laws.

In the first week of May, the former President Jiang Zemin called a high profile meeting where he asked for intensified efforts to make the public safer. The top judge Xiao Yang also included other crimes such as tax evasion, foreign exchange fraud, violation of intellectual property rights, production of fake, shoddy products and derelictions that resulted in major accidents in the production.

There was an obvious emphasis paid to the Chinese economy that was entering its critical phase of boom period. Xiao Yang stressed that the courts will strengthen the battle against crimes committed by companies, institutions and organizations that cause harm to the economic order of the nation. Regardless of the previous two “Strike Hard” campaigns, the law enforcement bodies were quite determined and confident of the improvements on operational mechanism of society and carrying out tough crackdowns on crimes. The anti-crime specialist Wang Dawei said, “*China is highly probable to reverse its worsening crime situation in two years*”.²⁰(sic)

Swift Executions

In April 2001, China witnessed a record number of executions. The central authorities in Beijing issued directives to intensify the “Strike Hard” campaign against crime. This was immediately followed by thousands of arbitrary arrests and a record number of executions in matter of few weeks. Within April and early July of 2001, 2960 death sentences were carried out and 1781 executions were confirmed. This scale of executions was unprecedented since the last “Strike Hard” campaign of 1996.

International Outcry

The swift nature of summary trials and swift executions received widespread international outcry and many human rights watchdogs phrased the campaign as ‘China’s execution frenzy’. The campaign turned to be very controversial from the beginning as it was deemed to violate international human rights laws. Amnesty International Briefing ‘Human Rights in China in 2001’ in August 2001 described the campaign as ‘A New Step Backwards’. The report²¹ surmised

Developments in the human rights situation in China over the past few months represent a major set back for human rights and the “rule of law”, and a new step backwards since the deterioration in human rights which started in late 1998. In 2001, the Chinese authorities have continued to show willingness to adhere on a pro forma level to the international human rights regime - notably by ratifying the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in February 2001. At the same time, however, they have

pursued domestic policies resulting in serious human rights violations on a large scale.”

Dilemma of Judiciary and Attorneys

The Judiciary in China often faced enigmatic situations such as whether to please higher authorities by delivering quick and swift results, which meant violating the proceedings of a fair trial, or protect the legal system to ensure fundamental human rights.

The Chinese lawyers face a number of bureaucratic obstacles in assisting their clients. The law enforcement bodies such as police, officials and courts reportedly view lawyers’ involvement as an unnecessary hurdle in the scope of securing fast convictions for the alleged criminals. Lawyers and suspects are granted very short and a limited number of meetings during pre-trial period. Lawyers are also required to brief police. The possibility of police terminating the meeting would be high if lawyers did not observe the protocol laid down by the police. The lawyers’ access to documents and material evidence were often restricted and even denied. In many cases the judicial and police authority charged exorbitant fees to get copies of documents. These scenarios undermine the legal professionals in China and the fairness of judiciary and the rule of law.

“Under such circumstances, the possibilities of miscarriages of justice and the execution of innocent people are immense. Police and prosecutors have been urged to cut corners, and not to “get entangled in the detail”, so as to achieve “quick approval, quick arrest, quick trial and quick results”. At meetings to prepare for “Strike Hard”, lawyers were reportedly called on to cooperate with the police and prosecution, and not to hold up the judicial process.”²¹

“Courts also boasted of their speed and “special procedures” during “strike hard”. Courts in Shandong province reportedly held an average of 65 criminal trials every day from 10 April to 25 May 2001. Courts in Suqian city, Jiangsu province, reported new procedures under which they completed full judicial proceedings in an average of 20 days - an example which was widely promoted in the official media.”

Violation of International Laws

According to legal experts the campaign violated many of the international laws related to death sentence. Some officials within China revealed the amount of pressure on the judicial and law enforcement bodies. Amnesty International report shows official concerns within the Chinese judiciary system.

“Official reports on the campaign reveal a total absence of concern for international norms, which require that the most careful judicial procedures be followed in death penalty cases. These reports indicate that pressure was put on the police and judicial authorities to achieve “quick results” in the campaign, including by curtailing judicial procedures, thus greatly increasing the potential for miscarriages of justice, arbitrary sentencing and the execution of innocent people.”²³

Convictions under the Campaign

According to the national statistics the conviction rates of crimes between 1998 to 2002 was 99.1%. The high conviction rate, raised serious doubts about the fairness in handing out sentences to the accused in such a short period of time. Experts in various parts of the world view that this kind of conviction rate can only be possible in cases of increased detention and arrest, restricted access to legal representation, the absence of a presumption of innocence before being proved guilty of crime, extreme pressure on police, procuratorate and courts to secure convictions.

“In the first ten months of the campaign, courts throughout China tried 162,822 criminal cases involving severe threats to public order, and 12,915 cases that seriously damaged market order, sentencing 210,779 and 15,945 criminals respectively, the criminal lawyer Mr. Xiao said.”

As in 1996 the “Strike Hard” campaign of 2001 too had numerous cases of governmental interference, a chief cause of concern for international bodies monitoring China today. The interference was more sophisticated compared to the 1996 campaign. The overt interference of government contradicts the claims of higher authorities who claimed that the judiciary in China was independent and without any external pressure. During the 2001 campaign, most

of the courts and the law enforcement bodies were thoroughly briefed by the authorities before they carried out the campaign.

“At meetings to prepare for “strike hard”, lawyers were reportedly called on to coordinate with the police and prosecution, and not to hold up the judicial process. Police and prosecutors were urged to cut corners, and not to “get entangled in the detail”, so as to achieve “quick approval, quick arrest, quick trial and quick results”. Examples of effective implementation of these instructions were given in the official media. In Hunan province, police boasted of “solving 3000 cases” in two days during a “Spring Thunder” operation carried out from 23 to 25 April 2001. In Sichuan province, police reported they had “cracked” 6704 cases in six days, including 691 murders, robberies or bombings, apprehending 19446 people from 19 to 24 April”²⁴

Under such circumstances it was difficult to ascertain whether law enforcement bodies- lawyers and police personnels carried out operations based on valid cases and circumstances or they simply carried out the operations for the sake of pleasing higher authorities to receive personal favors. Many of these actions in reality ended up in settling old scores and opportunity to serve interest. In this way many of the victims ended up as scapegoats in the hand of those who wielded authority and power.

The Special Case of Falun Gong and N. Korean Asylum Seekers

Officially the campaign was described as a measure to remove domestic crimes however the campaign actually violated many of the international laws and conventions enshrined in the United Nations Declaration such as the right to practice ones religious beliefs. The violations were also permitted in the case of crackdowns against Falun Gong spiritual movement and the refugee determination procedures in the case of forcible repatriation of North Korean asylum seekers. Amnesty International reported:

“In particular, the authorities have launched a new “strike hard” campaign against crime which led within a few weeks to a record number of executions, many of them believed to have been carried out after summary trials. They have stepped up the crackdown on the

Falun Gong spiritual movement, reportedly sanctioning for the first time the widespread use of violence against its members. They also launched a new wave of arrest and forcible repatriation of North Korean asylum seekers, denying them access to any refugee determination procedures, in breach of the principles embodied in the 1951 Refugee Convention to which China is a State party. In addition to these major developments, repression of dissent has continued, new restrictions have been imposed on the media, and numerous incidents of arbitrary detention, torture and other human rights violations have been reported across the country.”

The case of government interference was the allegations of violence against Falun Gong spiritual movement. The crackdowns and violence against the Falun Gong practitioners were ‘State sanctioned’. The testimonies of Falun Gong practitioners revealed that central leadership formed a ‘special government task force’ set up in Beijing to lead a campaign against Falun Gong spiritual movements. The “office 610”²⁵ issued unwritten instructions allowing officials and law enforcement bodies to ‘go beyond’ the legal constraints to conduct campaign against the Falun Gong practitioners. The authorities also issued instructions of proving them ‘clean chit’ or discharging them of legal responsibility if a Falun Gong practitioner dies in detention due to beatings. In one of Amnesty paper over 250 practitioners were reported to have died in custody since the spiritual movement was banned in July 1999, half of whom died in 2001 and many of deaths that resulted due to ill-treatment and torture were officially reported as ‘suicides’. Amnesty further states

“Amnesty International is gravely concerned by the allegations of state sanctioned violence against Falun Gong practitioners. The organisation’s concerns about the government’s campaign against the group include the arbitrary detention of thousands of practitioners- whether in “study classes”, regular detention centres or labour camps, unfair trials, and numerous allegations of torture of detained practitioners. Active attempts by officials to cover up or destroy evidence were alleged in a large number of these cases. This included reports of hasty cremation of the victims before relatives could see the bodies or before autopsies could be performed, and the detention of people who sought to publicise information about the

death in custody of relatives or friends. In the face of a body of credible evidence, official responses in many of these cases, rejecting outright all allegations of torture and ill-treatment, were both unconvincing and inadequate.”

Campaign Through Rallies

In the beginning of the campaign official media were filled with a new slogan “*Killing chickens to scare the monkeys*”. It marked the launch of rallies and parades on a massive scale. Rallies and parades were integral part of the campaign both in 1996 and 2001. The rallies of 1996 have a limited success and therefore it could be the reason for introducing it again in 2001. Comparatively, the rallies of 2001 were far larger in scale against the rallies of 1996 as this Amnesty report says it “*Not for many years have mass rallies and sentencing been seen on this scale. Like other “Strike Hard” campaigns before it, this crackdown is unlikely to have a lasting impact on China’s growing crime problem.*”

The earliest reported executions carried out in mass rallies took place in Shaanxi Province between April and May 2001. It is to note that a criminal who committed small offence could face execution under this campaign and he/she most probably be paraded and executed at the rallies. It is for this reason that there had been numerous rallies during the 2001 campaign. Amnesty reported that 1,800,000 spectators attended the rally.

“ Executions were carried out all over the country for crimes as diverse as bribery, pimping, embezzlement, tax and insurance fraud, robbing of petrol, selling harmful foodstuffs, drug offences, as well as violent crimes. Most executions have taken place after mass sentencing rallies in front of massive crowds in sports stadiums and public squares. Rallies in Shaanxi province in April and May were reportedly attended by 1,800,000 spectators. Tens of thousands of arrested suspects and thousands of others assigned without charge or trial to detention in “re-education through labour” camps were also paraded at these rallies. Those sentenced to death were also paraded through the streets past thousands of people on their way to the execution ground.”²⁶

“Ironically, sports stadiums were the last places where many of those condemned to death were taken, to be subjected to ritual

humiliation in front of large crowds, just before being executed. In the past stadiums like the Beijing’s Workers’ Stadium, which may be used as the Olympic football venue in 2008, have hosted such macabre events. Other condemned prisoners are paraded through the streets past thousands of people on the way to execution by firing squad in nearby fields or courtyards.”²⁷

Tens of thousands of arrested suspects and thousands assigned to “re-education through labour” without charge or trial have also been subject to public humiliation at “sentencing rallies”. In most Chinese cities, invited audiences, often numbering several thousand, are required to attend such rallies to learn to obey the law and the government. One rally in Yunnan province was reportedly broadcast live on state television and 1,800,000 spectators are said to have attended rallies in Shaanxi in April and May 2001 alone.”²⁸

Organ Harvesting

The practice of ‘organ harvesting’ from the executed prisoners under the Strike Hard Campaign was a common practice. This practice was reported in China, and not in Tibet. However, the authorities in China denied the practice despite convincing testimony from the US State Department. Kurt Samson, a UPI Medical Writer, one of the earliest doctors who worked in Chinese organ transplant hospital, discovered that he was a tool of China’s heinous activities and left China. He has since been a vociferous campaigner of anti-organ harvesting. In June 27 2001 [UPI]²⁹ Washington has this written testimony over the practice of organ selling business in China.

“Prisoners in China who are convicted of offenses that would barely carry prison sentences in the West are being executed so that their body organs, corneas and skin can be harvested and sold to a lucrative transplant market, lawmakers were told Wednesday. The House Committee of International Relations Subcommittee on International Relations and Human Rights heard gruesome first-person accounts of organs and skin being removed, sometimes while prisoners still showed signs of life, and sold to benefit the military and members of the Chinese elite”³⁰

According to eyewitness Wang Guoqi³¹ a former surgeon at a Chinese Army hospital, described how he participated in harvesting

skin from executed prisoners. He said, “*Security and court units routinely received envelopes containing cash after each procedure.*”

“Acquiring skin from executed prisoners usually took place around the major holidays or during the Strike Hard campaigns when prisoners would be executed in groups,” Guoqi told the panel. After he witnessed a botched execution where kidneys were removed from a prisoner and the body sent to the crematorium while still “half alive,” he asked his superiors for another post — a request that was denied. Guoqi left China in the spring of 2000, at which time, he said, “*they were still harvesting organs from execution sites.*”

As many as 1000 prisoners were executed every year in major cities of China and organs were sold to the international buyers, foreign visitors and wealthy Chinese. In certain cases citizens from United States traveled to China for kidney transplants. The organ harvesting business was well protected. The nature of the execution of prisoners was already predicted by what kind of ‘organ’ they are going to rip away from him. As this report illustrates³²

“This document states that those who are sentenced to death are to be executed immediately by means of shooting,” said Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-Fla., subcommittee chairperson. “*We will hear testimony about how this translates into a shot to the heart if corneas are needed and a shot to the back of the head for other organs. Family members of the executed prisoners are forced to pay for the bullets used.*”

Harry Hu, Executive Director of the Laogai Research Center, human rights organization based in Milpitas, California, once told the panel before becoming a U.S citizen of his personal experience in Chinese prison.

“I spent 19 years in the Chinese Laogai camps, a place where the space between life and death is often paper thin,” he testified. “*I knew that if I had died in the camps, my family would never be told of my fate. My organs would have been harvested for transplantation into the body of someone else and then the rest of me tossed into a furnace as waste to be disposed quickly.*”³³

Harry Hu reported that China’s “Strike Hard Campaign,” launched in 1983, allowed ‘rapid administration of justice’ and heavy sentences for offenders. During the last Strike Hard Campaign in 1996, the execution rate soared to a record of 4,367, he said, many of these prisoners’ organs were gathered and sold.³⁴ He further stated that harvesting of organs from the executed prisoners proceeded entirely as a ‘State owned, controlled operation’.

Harry Hu explicates and exposes the entire system from court to the final ripping of organs where Chinese officials play an integral role:

“This begins in the courtroom as judges and other court officials provide for speedy adjudication of cases and rapid turnover of death sentence appeals to ensure that a prisoner will be executed at the optimal time to harvest an organ for the waiting patient,” He further notes *“Court officials often inform doctors when they pass down death sentences, alerting them to contact the prison to make a match for transplant patients.”*³⁵

Patriotic Re-education and “Strike Hard”

The 1983 campaign was against crimes, in 1996 it became against “splittist activities” and the “Dalai Clique” under the massive banner of “Patriotic Re-education” campaign and in 2001 it was against all expressions of political dissent. However, it is important to note that ‘Patriotic Re-education’ of 1996 launched with the “Strike Hard” campaign in the same year were complimentary to each other. Both have similarities in their manner, implementation and in content. ‘Patriotic Re-education’ became a channel through which the “Strike Hard” campaign was implemented in Tibet.

There was a persistent ambiguity over the relationship between “Strike Hard” and “Patriotic Re-education” campaign. Some observers say “Patriotic Re-education” was an attendant of “Strike Hard” campaign. This contradicts the official stand because the “Strike Hard” campaign was withdrawn on 31 July while “Patriotic Re-education” appeared in the later half of 1996. However, there were only two possibilities, in one case “Strike Hard” campaign and “Patriotic Re-education” were two separate campaigns that happened to be launched

in the same year or in another case they were complimentary to each other. Research studies showed “Patriotic Re-education” as a separate campaign with a separate political objective i.e. “Anti-Dalai” campaign (denunciation and opposing Dalai Lama in so called his ‘splittist activities’.) It is now seen for many years that monasteries and nunneries in Tibet were the bastions of political dissidence. It was there that the “Patriotic Re-education” Campaign was launched mainly to achieve political indoctrination in monasteries and nunneries. Hence, this report maintains “Patriotic Re-education” a key component of “Strike Hard” campaign.

The report concludes that “Patriotic Re-education” as a channel through which the “Strike Hard” Campaign was launched. This refutes that the Chinese authorities in Tibet have no legitimate ‘excuse’ to put their hands into religious affairs. The “Patriotic Re-education” is a euphemism. ‘Patriotic’ suggest not being loyal to one great Motherland ideology and ‘Re-education’ is an implied correction. Through this euphemistic term Chinese authorities seemed to sell the campaign to the larger international audience who were watching China very closely. This political move was only to gain a ‘legitimacy’ to carry out the campaign that was expected to attract strong international criticism. At the same time the legitimacy the Chinese authorities gained from the “Strike Hard” campaign against crimes had helped them to cover the “Patriotic Re-education” under the legal shadow. In the ultimate assessment those monks and nuns who resisted the “Patriotic Re-education” were dealt harshly by the “Strike Hard” campaign. In this respect both of these campaigns are complimentary to each other.

Work Forums

The change in the course of the campaign had actually taken place during the third Work Forum on Tibet on July 1994. There was a relationship between the policy implementations charted out in Work Forums on Tibet and the “Strike Hard” campaigns of 1996 and 2001. Tibet Information Network (London based human rights monitoring organization on Tibet) carried out this report on China’s Tibet Work Forums.

“The First Tibet Work Forum was held in 1980 during the period of liberalisation following the Cultural Revolution, and the second in 1984. Both the First and Second Forums were influenced by Party moderates such as Hu Yaobang and set out relatively liberal policies for Tibet work. The Third Tibet Work Forum, held in 1994 following the large-scale demonstrations of the late 1980s, criticised previous Tibet policy for being too liberal and making too many concessions to Tibetan nationalists and effectively ruled out the possibility of any “Tibetanised” form of development. Instead policies laid down at the Third Forum were directed at the integration of Tibet into the wider Chinese economic and cultural model. The Third Forum fully endorsed the policy of fast-track economic development and “opening up”, resulting in the movement of Chinese migrant workers and entrepreneurs into Tibet, and marked both an official end to moderate policies discriminating in favour of Tibetan culture and religion and to an increasing role for Tibetans in government and the economy.

The Fourth Tibet Work Forum provides a central mandate for the policies currently being implemented in Tibet, along with broad guidelines that TAR leaders and officials must follow in all future work and projects. Plans laid out in the TAR Tenth Five Year Plan and recent speeches by Tibet’s leaders were already closely in accord with the Party line subsequently set out at the Beijing meeting. Unlike the Third Forum, which marked a major shift in policy from the First and Second Forums in response to events in Tibet, the Fourth Forum appears to endorse the general policies laid down at the Third Forum and to carry them forward. Development remains a priority and the Party line on Tibetan culture and religion continues to stress the need to increase control and to promote a “Marxist outlook” on culture and religion. Jiang Zemin said at the Fourth Forum that it is important to “strengthen the administration of religious affairs, strike those who use religion to carry out splittist criminal activities, and vigorously lead Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to socialism.” (Xinhua, 30 June 2001). The Dalai Lama remains the prime target for official attacks on splittism.”

It is openly acknowledged by the authorities that the economic development of Tibet is both a political as well as an economic issue. The former Chinese President Jiang Zemin and former Premier Zhu Rongji both made the political priorities of developing Tibet’s economy clear at the Fourth Tibet Work Forum. The former Premier Zhu Rongji said,

“The special supportive methods and policies adopted by the Central government towards Tibet are not only in consideration of Tibet’s particular difficulties. Looking at it from the perspective of protecting the unity of the nationalities, the unity of the motherland and state security, these methods and policies are the requirements of Tibet’s situation and the needs of China’s overall situation.”³⁶

“Strike Hard” Campaign as a Political Tool

Beijing’s obsession with two mantras of ‘Stability’ and ‘Development’ became Jiang’s famous ‘dictums’ on Tibet. Beijing was convinced that the political dissidence in Tibet could be countered by economic prosperity and accelerated development. This indicated Beijing’s ‘carrot’ as a new strategy against separatist force. It also came handy as China underwent economic growth and made giant strides on the developmental front. But there is more to the ‘face value’ in Tibet. Many pundits believe that it is to attract the inflow of investment from the investors from Mainland China into Tibet. It is also the long time interest of encouraging and escalating the influx of population transfer to Tibet to facilitate the ‘Sinicization’ of Tibet.

An article in the Tibet Daily on the 5th of April 2001 recognized certain priorities.³⁷

“The anniversary provided an opportunity for cadres and the masses of each ethnic group to further recognize that comprehensive and coordinated social, political, economic and cultural development in Tibet is the great victory that comes from integrating the ethnic policy implemented by the Party with the actual conditions in Tibet. Ethnic identity and culture, particularly religion, are portrayed by Beijing as obstacles to development, and the focus on the 17-Point Agreement anniversary underscores the official premise that the interests of Tibetans or minority nationalities are the same as those of the Han Chinese”.

In the final assessment, China’s policy over Tibet since 1990s despite its propaganda, aimed to accomplish:

- An acceleration of economic progress and development
- Transfer of ethnic Chinese migrants
- Strengthening of absolute control over religious institutions
- Curbing of splittist forces or pro-independence activities

- Intensifying border vigilances and the ideological war against the Dalai Lama.

These policies have a direct link to the call made by President Jiang Zemin to direct “Strike Hard” campaign against political dissidence in Tibet.

In Tibet the “Strike Hard” Campaign was more directed against the sensitive political activities than against criminals. On the other hand it became an ideal tool to implement their objective policies in Tibet, given the fact that the campaign had harsh measures to those who refused to comply.

Landmark Political Events

There were two landmark political events that had a lasting impact on the “Strike Hard” campaigns. First, there were the massive political uprisings in 1987, 1988 and 1989 that compelled the central leadership in Beijing to reverse the liberal policies on Tibet. Second, the conferment of the Nobel Peace prize for Dalai Lama in 1989, that gave him widespread international popularity and support for the Tibetan cause. At the same time international communities were exerting strong pressure on the Chinese government to resolve the Tibet issue. These resulted in a renewed separatist political movement in Tibet and the over haul of massive turn around of world opinion on Tibet issue with China losing steam on their propaganda on Tibet.

For Beijing it became a challenge to deal with two fronts with no clear political strategy. The “Strike Hard” campaign just provided that ideal ground to carry out harsh crackdowns on elements which pursue political dissidence. It also empowered authorities to infiltrate the supreme authority of Dalai Lama in the religious institutions that automatically challenged the Chinese authority over Tibet. It also established the new politico-religious dimension where there were two ‘power base’ within Tibet. On one side Dalai Lama commanded supreme influence on Tibetans and on the other side is China’s political stranglehold over Tibet. In such political scenario a new political campaign was lurking imminent. The launch of “Patriotic Re-education” campaign and its full force had finally begun.

“Patriotic Re-education” explained in simple words is the government interference in the religious institutions of Tibet to introduce political education in monasteries and nunneries. The campaign was carried out by “work teams” who were but ‘political doctors’. Soon the state owned newspapers came out with a new rhetoric or slogan. *“Cutting off the serpent’s head”* or *‘the Anti-Dalai campaign’*. The campaign was to introduce Marxist outlook to Buddhism or reshaping of Buddhism to suit the needs of socialist China.

In early 1996 the ‘tone’ of the “Strike Hard” campaign grew grim and serious. For the first time authorities started accusing the Dalai Lama and the supposed anti-Party high Lamas. This statement from the authority indicates

“[T]hose who make use of religion to interfere with administrative, judicial, martial, educational, and other social affairs, especially those who take advantage of religious reasons to split the country, must be severely cracked down upon according to law.”

The “Strike Hard” campaign by its legal standard cannot be applied directly to Tibetans without criminal cases. Buddhism and Tibetans loyalty to Dalai Lama is not enough to justify the campaign. Then a month later on May 6 1996 the new rhetoric called “Patriotic Re-education” campaign was issued. The “Patriotic Re-education” campaign was first launched in Mainland China and then in Tibet. There appeared to be a political ploy behind the timing in the launch of “Patriotic Re-education” campaign because through it the authorities could present a perfect reason in interfering in the religious institutions. The “Strike Hard” campaign cannot be applied against religious institutions and it was therefore “Patriotic Re-education” campaign meant for educating monks and nuns provided ‘legitimacy’ for authorities to lay their hands in religious institutions. On 15 April 1996 Tibet’s newspapers announced the complete ban on the pictures of Dalai Lama. On May 6 1996 the “work teams” arrived at the Ganden monastery to remove all the photographs of Dalai Lama that ended up in a violent and fierce confrontation between the monks and police.

“[T]he Dalai Clique, together with some western powers has continued to spread counter-revolutionary activities which have affected the unity of the Motherland. In response, China adopts the following principles: Strike Hard against Splittists; Maintain social security by punishing reactionary criminals; Oppose the Dalai Clique and safeguard the Motherland; Protest against splittist propaganda; Punish the counter-revolutionary activities in accordance with the Chinese constitution and charter.”³⁸

The operation of “Patriotic Re-education” showed its own trademark style of operation. First the President or Premier would launch the slogan and guidelines in the State media. This was followed by Party mouthpiece such as Xinhua and People’s Daily newspapers to reach en masse attached with an official propaganda. Then the propaganda department would carry out the work of “Ideological branding” of ‘target’ as ‘bad’ and ‘enemy’ of Party and then ‘legitimize’ the action to be taken against them. The third phase will be task carried out by highly armed and trained police patrols such as Public Security Bureau (PSB) and People’s Armed Police (PAP).

The “Patriotic Re-education” had now become a viable channel through which the “Strike Hard” campaign was justified and made legitimate. It was the formal opening up of crackdowns on religious front including the unspoken targets such as high Lamas. The campaign took place in September 1997 as this finding report on Anti-Splittism.³⁹

“In September 1997, China announced that “work-teams” conducting “Patriotic Re-education” Campaign had covered 1,780 of Tibet’s 1,787 monasteries and temples and 30,000 of the 46,000 monks had received “re-education”. In December, reeducation expanded beyond the monasteries to the general population. This campaign, launched in May 1996, is the latest installment of numerous programs to reeducate Tibetans into accepting their designation as a minority group within the big family of the Chinese motherland.”

The report from Gu-Chu-Sum (Organization of ex-political prisoners of Tibet) argues a similar opinion on the complimentary nature between the “Strike Hard” and “Patriotic Re-education” campaign.⁴⁰

“The work-teams are composed mainly of Public Security Bureau (PSB) officials. Some of the team members are Tibetan, but most are Chinese. The teams lead extended reeducation sessions, often three or four days a week for three months or more. The teams’ main goals are to identify and expel monks and nuns they deem unpatriotic and to extract loyalty pledges from those remaining.”

Those who remained in the monastery had to take loyalty pledges to the Party and to perform the ‘unthinkable’ act blasphemy according to their Buddhist faith. The pledges are as follows:

1. Agree to historical unity of China and Tibet
2. Recognize Chinese appointed Panchen Lama
3. Deny Tibet ever would be independent
4. Denounce Dalai Lama as a traitor or splittist
5. Declare opposition to separatism

The authorities stepped up the ‘infiltration’ of monasteries and nunneries and encroached monastic life. Monastic life was monitored through arbitrary violations of privacy and through intimidation. The ‘work team’ personnels carried out “re-education” in monasteries randomly and often the features of the ‘struggle sessions’ of the Cultural Revolution are quite common. Any kind of slight disapproval, displeasure and disobedience lead to arrests. Not a slight act of dissent was tolerated. The Tibetan Centre For Human Rights and Democracy had previously reported similar case of political education by “work teams”.

“Ngawang Tharchin, 25, from Drepung Monastery contradicted a work-team member’s statement that Tibet was part of China since the Song dynasty. He contradicted the work-team’s version of Tibet’s history on three other occasions and once criticized a team member’s lack of knowledge on the subject. The work-team members arrested and sentenced him without trial to three years of ‘Re-education through Labor.’ At last report he is currently held in Trisam Prison. Gyaltzen Yeshe, about 20, also a Drepung monk, was arrested around the same time. Gyaltzen challenged the work-team to provide unbiased records and historical evidence to prove their version of history. He received three-year imprisonment.”⁴¹

This report from TCHRD shows the intensity of the “Patriotic Re-education” campaign and the Tibetan protest.”

Challenging the work-team is not the only reason for which monks and nuns are arrested. Two nuns at Raeteling Samtenling nunnery in Lhasa, Yeshi Palmo and Tenzin Yeshe, were both arrested during a Patriotic Re-education session. They received six-year sentences for pasting wall-posters and are now in Drapchi Prison. A work-team arrested Gendun Gyaltzen, the caretaker monk at the main temple of Sakya monastery (Shigatse Region) at a political meeting on August 23, 1996. The team had found pictures and cassettes of the Dalai Lama when they searched his room. The police released him after one week and the work-team expelled him from the monastery. There are many stories like these. TCHRD has conducted an update on August 12, 2004 on the monks and nuns expelled from Monasteries and Nunneries under the “Patriotic Re-education” campaign and found out that over 19,133 has since been expelled.”

The Tibetans found themselves in a very difficult position. Either they had to comply with the Party to commit religious blasphemy or to leave the monastic life clandestinely or out of compulsion. In many cases they preferred to flee. Either way Beijing’s purpose of destroying Tibetan Buddhist culture was served. This TCHRD report illustrates the dilemmas faced by the thousands of monks and nuns in Tibet.

“The reeducation campaign is the authorities’ tool for controlling Tibet’s religion. They see religion as a political problem and monasteries as centers of rebellion. Some resign rather than denounce the Dalai Lama and some flee after a demonstration or pasting posters on the walls.”

By the end of the 1997, nearly all of Tibet’s monks and nuns were ‘re-educated’ and “work teams” periodically visited them to ensure the ‘compliance’. Having achieved a limited success, the Party expanded the scope to other areas; In December 1997 the “work teams” infiltrated into ‘agricultural communities, towns, cities, government organs and schools.

“The monks of Samdrubling monastery reportedly resigned en masse and closed the doors themselves rather than sign a denunciation of the Dalai Lama. In conjunction with the campaign, the authorities

imposed a minimum age of 18 for admission to the monasteries. All monks and nuns younger are summarily expelled by the work-teams, as are all those arrested or suspected of splittist activities. At the end of the session, those who sign the pledge receive red identity cards and can remain in the monastery. Those who don't sign get blue or green cards and are kicked out. Once expelled, they cannot join any other monastery.”⁴²

The Third Forum convened in 1994 was a turning point in “Strike Hard” and “Patriotic Re-education” campaigns. As this report shows

“The forum, composed of China’s top leaders published its directives in a document titled as A Golden Bridge Leading to a New Era. The document identified Buddhism as a big rock in the road to that bridge”. The outcome of the meeting as one top official describes “A number of religious institutions have been used at times by a few people who harbor sinister motives to plot against us and have become counter-revolutionary bases. The influence of our enemies in foreign countries, especially the “Dalai clique,” is slipping into the monasteries of our religion more than ever.” The Party determined to take greater control and require a declaration of loyalty from every monk and nun. “We must enhance the administration of the monasteries, especially of those troublesome ones... we must choose well the members of the Democratic Management Committees so that it is patriotic devotees... who have authority over the monasteries.”⁴³

The People’s Daily commanded to commence the refashioning of Tibetan Buddhism to suit the needs of Party to ‘facilitate the development’ of Tibet:

“Tibetan Buddhism must self-reform... they must adopt themselves to suit the development and stabilization of Tibet... Religious tenets and practices which do not comply with a socialist society should be changed.” The campaign to ‘eliminate’ Dalai Lama from the face of Tibetan Buddhism was launched for the first time. It was first reported in a commentary of Party mouthpiece, People’s Daily November 20, 1995 “Only by adopting a clear cut stand in waging a struggle against the Dalai clique to totally wipe out his influence can Tibet enjoy a long term stability and can Tibetan Buddhism establish a normal religious order in a better way.”⁴⁴

The Third Forum envisioned a ‘strategy’ of what they called *“Broad masses of people” to declare their ‘loyalty’ to China. In November 1997 the Deputy Secretary of “TAR” Party committee Ragdi announced on regional television “we must declare a total war, in thinking and theory and in the ideological realm on the Dalai Lama and his separatist force.”*⁴⁵

According to China’s own statement,⁴⁶ the party claimed that some 30,000 of Tibet’s 46,000 Buddhist monks and nuns have received ‘reeducation’ and 1,780 of Tibet’s 1,787 monasteries and temples have been covered and infiltrated by work teams. However we are not very sure of the statistics, it is possible that China may exaggerate the figure to suit their propaganda and to please the higher authorities in Beijing.

In another report it confirms that the combination of “Strike Hard” and “Patriotic Re-education” could continue for much longer duration as there are growing evidences which suggest both campaigns were incorporated as China’s long term policy on Tibet as this reports says

*“China’s official newspaper reported that the reeducation campaign could continue for the next three to five years. Regarding the widened scope of the campaign the head of the Tibetan Ethnic Religious Committee declared, “If the patriotic reeducation is carried out only in the temples, then the instability will continue.”*⁴⁷

One writer sums up about ‘Anti-splittism’

*“The current ‘anti-splittism’ campaigns are the real measure of China’s commitment to human rights, and of its policies on Tibet. While Jiang Zemin says he expects to see positive changes in the Dalai Lama and looks forward to a dialogue, Jiang’s police are imprisoning and brutalizing Tibetans who dare simply to keep a photograph of His Holiness. So long as the Strike Hard and the reeducation campaign continue, China’s professed reforms will remain simply a public relations campaign by the most murderous dictatorship in the world’s history.”*⁴⁸

Jampa Phunstok the present vice Secretary of “TAR”(Tibet Autonomous Region) and the former Secretary of the Lhasa City Chinese Communist Party Committee described the campaign as “a

deeper anti-separatist struggle” that must be continued in Tibet. To one of the Chinese radio broadcast in Tibet on 30 April the Secretary Jampa Phunstok announced on 29 April at a meeting in Lhasa.

He said, *“Arrangement must be made at the immediate launching of “Strike Hard” campaign in order to improve the social order in the city.”* He also added *“there should be a renewed crackdown on criminal activities, improvement on the police by political means (reference to political education of security personnel and the strengthening of the grassroots organizations.”*

The official Party newspaper, the Xinhua published the address by Zeng Qinghong on 4 July 2001 and a speech given by Hu Jintao on 19 July 2001 to the high quality contingent of cadres to be sent to Tibet on separate occasions. These cadres were well trained with professional expertise necessary to carry out harsh crackdowns in Tibet. The speech has five ‘must do’ principles in delivering out their actoins in Tibet. It revealed the ‘essence’ of what would soon become the guidelines of the “Strike Hard” campaign.

1. Adhere to the correct orientation and hold position firmly.
2. Give full play to Tibet unique advantages
3. Protect the unity among the cadres of different ethnic groups
4. Share weal and woes with the masses, find out their sentiments
5. Take effective measures, conduct strict inspections, and take ‘rapid and resolute actions.’

The “Strike Hard” campaign of 2001 was officially launched on 4 April 2001. The first wave of the campaign reached Tibet on May 2001. The Chinese authorities in Tibet under the directives from the central leadership in Beijing called for a work meeting concerning stability in Tibet held on May 2001 in which components of campaign were widely discussed. This report from TCHRD illustrates

“At a work meeting on social stability in Tibet, held in the first week of May 2001, specific rules and regulations were issued to all levels of courts in the “Tibet Autonomous Region” to carry out the campaign further and more forcefully among the common populace. The minutes of the meeting, published in Tibet Daily on 8 May 2001, stipulated that the “Strike Hard” scheme considers threat to the

nation’s stability, manslaughter, robbery, arms-related crimes and theft as main offences.”

The moment the “Strike Hard” campaign was announced in Tibet, the campaign immediately took its political dimensions adding to the regional political sensitivity of the autonomous areas of Tibet and Xinjiang.

Wang Lequan, the Party Secretary of Xinjiang reported to the South China Morning Post on 30 May

“The Strike Hard campaign is a national campaign and different regions have a different focus depending on their local situations. In Xinjiang, Strike Hard is aimed at burglars, thieves and those participating in violent crimes. But [we also have] the separatists, religious extremists and terrorists. These people are conspiring to jeopardize national security”.

While the Strike Hard campaign in China focuses mainly on crimes such as drug smuggling, theft and murder, there is a strong political dimension to the campaign in the ‘nationality autonomous’ areas of Tibet and Xinjiang where Strike Hard is linked to the ‘anti-splittist struggle’.⁴⁹

The spokesperson of Amnesty International further said *“There has been a particular focus on separatists and alleged terrorists in Xinjiang during the Strike Hard campaign. As a consequence people have been executed and in some cases it has been unclear whether they have actually been involved in violent offences. They are unlikely to have had a fair trial and therefore there are likely to be miscarriages of justice”⁵⁰*

The Dalai Lama was the chief target of the “Strike Hard” campaign in Tibet. It is in this political reality that political campaign of “Patriotic Re-education” was launched in monasteries and nunneries. TIN 2001 report highlights the intensity of campaign.

“The Dalai Lama is frequently blamed by Chinese officials for the incitement of “criminal activities” in Tibet. An article in the official newspaper Tibet Daily on 19 June said that the rising crime rate in

Nagchu prefecture in the TAR was partly due to “the infiltration of the Dalai clique’s splittist activities into rural and pastoral areas”.

The core of China’s “Strike Hard” and “re-education” campaigns is to force the monks and nuns to oppose notions of Tibetan nationalism and to denounce the Dalai Lama. Those who refuse risk severe repercussions. As of February 1998, 3, 993 monks and nuns were expelled from their monasteries or nunneries, 294 were arrested and 14 deaths have been reported. Six monasteries and nunneries were completely closed down. In addition, since the publication of the report “Closing The Door”, TCHRD has learned of the closure of Rakor Nunnery in Toelung Dechen County in 2002. This nunnery situated 12 km from Lhasa and which accommodated 80 nuns was shut down following the entry of Chinese “work-team” members to conduct “Patriotic Re-education” sessions on March 17, 1997. All the nuns were expelled following their refusal to comply with the instructions of the “work-team”.

In this respect TCHRD expressed grave concern over the nature in which the campaign was implemented in Tibet with specific hidden agendas

“The principal area of concern for the Tibetans originates essentially from the fact that the campaign takes a different form and focus in Tibet. For the Tibetans, the “Strike Hard” campaign has always had serious human rights implications. There have been numerous cases of arrests and detentions, torture and long-term imprisonment, for mere expression of support for Tibetan independence and the Dalai Lama which the authorities view as “endangering state security” affecting stability of the nation. Such incidences have more of a political connotation than that of a criminal angle thereby camouflaging the real intent of the campaign”.

The campaign of “Patriotic Re-education” under “Strike Hard” campaign threatened the very foundation of Tibetan Buddhism. TCHRD reported:

“Similarly, the ongoing “Patriotic Re-education” in Tibet’s religious institutions since 1996 demonstrates identical mission to suppress patriotic sentiments and outburst, and to mould the monastic

community along the Party’s communist line. The campaign, besides being a serious infringement on the rights of the Tibetan monks and nuns in terms of their belief, practice and allegiance, has resulted in many arrests and expulsions.”

In Tibet there were also instances of ‘rallies’ witnessed under the official slogan *“Killing the chickens to scare the monkeys”*. On 19 June 2001 Tibet Daily reported execution in Nagchu prefecture under the initial period of *“Strike Hard and rectification drive”*. The official newspaper reported Suoduo the chief culprit of a criminal gang was executed on 21 May after a public sentencing rally. In Nyingtri Prefecture three criminals were also executed ‘by shooting’. Tibet Daily in a separate article said that announcement of executions in the official media were meant to serve as a deterrent to the wider society. TIN report in 2001 carried out other reports of crackdowns.

“A third Tibet Daily article on 19 June about the Strike Hard campaign gave an account of the confiscation by police in Shigatse prefecture of various materials including “8,180 kg of dynamite, 1, 920 meters of blasting fuse, 600 kg of highly toxic pesticide” and “four bombs with steel balls [sharpnel]”. The Tibet Daily report does not indicate whether these materials were seized in connection with possible “splittist” or other criminal acts. All of these materials are available on the black market in China. Dynamite and explosives made out of fertilizer and ammonia are frequently used for illegal mining and road construction workers also use dynamite to blow up rock falls from landslides. It is likely that the reports of the seizure of these materials are aimed at highlighting the achievements of the Shigatse authorities in line with Beijing’s Strike Hard policy. “Explosions” were listed by Jiang Zemin as one of the most serious crimes to be targeted in the nationwide Strike Hard crackdown.”

In Shigatse Prefecture in the months of April, May and June there were a number of major rallies and parades of prisoners. The chief motive was to publicize the *“Strike Hard”* campaign. On 19 June 2001 Tibet Daily reported, *“By the end of May, the prefecture had held 13 public arrest and public judgment-pronouncement meetings, at which 72 suspects and criminals were publicly arrested and sentenced.”* These public rallies are commonplace in Tibet and in China where the attendance of local people were compulsory. There

were few accounts of rallies witnessed by tourists who visited Tibet at the time. In one account of public rally at Lhasa in 1998 described to TIN by a tourist.

“I saw two Chinese blue trucks in a convoy of police vehicles, each truck carrying four prisoners, heading west on East Dekyi Lam. They had one prisoner at the front of the cabin and three over the side facing the street at either side; each prisoner was accompanied by two soldiers who were in full riot gear in camouflage clothes and transparent mask. At the front of each truck there was a mounted machine gun with one soldier standing behind the machine gun. In the procession there were about 20 police motorbikes, some with side-cars, about 14 mini-vans and five land-cruisers, and at least 50 police officers and 50 soldiers. The procession turned right into Nyangdren Lam and stopped in front of the market, blocking the road.”

A TIN report of a tourist account is similar in feature:

“The tourist reported that a desk and microphone were set up in the street with a banner in Chinese that read: “Public Sentencing Rally”. “Six of the prisoners were brought down to ground level and then each of them was brought forward as their sentence was read out,” the tourist told TIN. “They were all handcuffed and at least one had ankle shackles. The two who were left on the trucks had a rope on their neck tied to their hands and they weren’t handcuffed. An official behind the desk read out the sentences in Chinese. Hundreds of people came to see what was going on but there was no reaction from the crowd. It was too difficult for people to talk to me because the police had already tried to take my camera.”

The 2001 “Strike Hard” campaign in Tibet, was first directed at Lhasa City, then at Nagchu Prefecture, then later at Nyingtri and Shigatse Prefectures respectively. Beijing’s long time strategy to controlling Tibetan Buddhist monastic tradition is a clever plot of letting the monastic tradition out of the track and pushing it towards the cliff. In old Tibet 90% of monks and nuns enter monastic life at very young age. This is owing to the kind of vast study they have to undergo a way to become a successful scholar of Buddhism to carry out a life long practice. China’s new policy of entering monastic life only after reaching the age of 18 is calculated on very practical reasons. The Tibetan parents under this policy must then look for an alternative

path for their children. The only viable option for the parents is to send their children to schools and chart out their career. At the age of 18 they reach the stage of adulthood and have to start looking after the domestic affairs. In this case there is very little chance that they would return to the monastic discipline except under exceptional circumstances. Most likely they would choose lay life than monastic order. Through such policies the authorities are able to reduce the number of monks and nuns entering the monastic tradition.

High Profile Cases in Tibet

The most pressing issue Tibetans facing today is the case of Trulku Tenzin Delek Rinpoche implicated in a “terrorist act” under the “Strike Hard” campaign. Trulku was allegedly convicted of the ‘explosions’ in Chengdu city on 3 April 2002 without concrete evidences. Lobsang Dhondup, another accused in the explosions, despite strong international appeal and China’s promise of a lengthy and fair trial was swiftly executed on 26 Jan 2003. Amnesty International covered a case study on him under the paper “*Executed according to law?*” The paper focuses on the death penalty cases in China. Amnesty International defended Trulku Tenzin Delek Rinpoche.

“Lobsang Dhondup and Tenzin Delek Rinpoche

3 April 2002 - Lobsang Dhondup detained on suspicion of causing an explosion

7 April 2002 - Tenzin Delek Rinpoche detained on suspicion of collusion

2 December 2002 - Lobsang Dhondup sentenced to death; Tenzin Delek Rinpoche sentenced to death suspended for two years

26 January 2003 - Tenzin Delek Rinpoche’s appeal rejected, Lobsang Dhondup executed

Lobsang Dhondup, an ethnic Tibetan from the traditionally Tibetan area of western Sichuan Province, was detained on 3 April 2002 in Chengdu, “within 10 minutes” of allegedly detonating a bomb in the city’s main square, according to a report in the official press.(60) Other official reports claim he was arrested 10 hours after the explosion, whereas witness statements claim he was detained as long as two days after the explosions. He was also eventually charged

with “causing explosions” on several other occasions since January 2001 in different locations in western Sichuan Province. Again however, official reports give conflicting accounts of the number of bombs he allegedly detonated, and when and where the explosions occurred.(61)

Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche was detained on 7 April 2002 at his monastery in Litang County, Sichuan Province on suspicion of planning and supplying funding for the 3 April 2002 explosion in Chengdu. He was also accused of planning and funding several of the other bombings attributed to Lobsang Dhondup.(62) Both men were also suspected of and charged with producing and distributing “splittist” letters and handbills advocating independence for Tibet, reportedly found at the scenes of the blasts; Lobsang Dhondup was additionally charged with illegally possessing arms and ammunition. Numerous other people associated with Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche have been detained, arrested and sentenced to prison or labour camp terms since his initial detention.(63)

Official reports on the case claim both men confessed to the crimes.(64) Both were held incommunicado for most of the eight-month period between detention and their eventual trial, and it was during this period of incommunicado detention that Lobsang Dhondup is said to have confessed under torture. It is not known when lawyers were allowed access to the men. Official reports claim both were assigned lawyers by the procuratorate, but the presence of lawyers in court for sentencing at least has been denied by members of the men’s families who attended the sentencing hearings. Furthermore, Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche is known to have been denied access to lawyers of his choice, possibly due to the stipulation in the Criminal Procedure Law on the need to “seek approval” before gaining access to lawyers in cases involving “state secrets.”

Border Security

Border security is one of the sensitive issues under the campaign. The major part of the information within Tibet is gathered from Tibetans who escape through the Nepal-Tibet border. During the campaign the border vigilance was stepped up and according to TIN 2003 report.

“During the “Strike Hard” struggle, the Public Security Border Defense unit hunted down and seized a total of 254 people who are stealing across the border and captured various reactionary materials”.

“Strike Hard” Campaign: China’s crackdown on political dissidence

People who are entering Tibet with the material deemed politically sensitive are treated more harshly and could end up in prisons. China’s much dependent and tamed neighbor Nepal is under extreme pressure to deliver goods to Beijing. The Nepalese government has since then deported many Tibetans who have attempted the crossing. In recent times the Tibetans who return to Tibet are put under close vigilance and in many cases they are intimidated on the grounds of suspicion. In 2001 TIN reported tightening control along the border areas.

“According to Xinhua security personals on the Chinese side of the border have stepped up the patrols in the Nangpa La pass as a part of Strike Hard campaign ...tracked and apprehended more than 2500 people trying to cross the border... during the Strike Hard campaign, officers and men of Tibetan border patrol units have to brave freezing conditions and extreme discomfort in order to carry out their duties of preserving stability in the border regions of the motherland”.

The Tibet Daily, on 21st July, 2004, reported of an establishment of a “Re-education- through -Labor” Camp on the Fren Xin Highway in Ngari County. The official explanation for the establishment of the Camp, was that it would bring economic prosperity and social stability in the Ngari Prefecture. In reality, it is an indication of the government’s hard line policy in cracking down on fleeing Tibetan refugees and checking political dissidence in the region. Ngari County falls in the route of fleeing Tibetan refugees and those returning to Tibet from Nepal/India. The newly established facility will enable authorities to enhance their crackdown on the Tibetans more easily.

Chapter 4

Torture under "Strike Hard" Campaign

After acquiring a 'political tone' in the 1996 re-launch the campaign immediately took its impact on those who were suspected of political background and its related activities. This report vindicates "*over one hundred of political prisoners, many of them nuns and monks, remain in prison in Tibet. Most were detained for peacefully practicing their religion or for advocating independence of Tibet*".⁵¹

Many have been arrested and sentenced to terms in prison for merely possessing clandestine documents, political literature, Tibetan national flags and pictures of the Dalai Lama. Some others have been sentenced to 'reform through labor' after short summary trials. Many of them were also placed under terms of administrative detention (known as 'Re-education through Labor') without formal charge or trial. Many political prisoners, including several prisoners of conscience, appear to have been detained without charge."⁵²

The prison conditions in Tibet are below international standards and earned the infamy of having harsh treatments and prisoners are forced to work for long hours in unimaginable conditions. Prisoners received inadequate food of a very poor quality. As a result of unhygienic sanitations, prisoners suffer from various health problem such as diarrhea and digestive problems. The medical attention and health care in prison is inadequate. It is learnt from many ex political prisoners that medication are administered at the late stage when the chances of prisoner's survival is dim. Drapchi for instance, which housed the largest number of prisoners is said to have a small clinic with only one resident nurse but no doctor⁵³.

The medical system has been biased and only serious ailments like tuberculosis, liver disease and kidney problems are attended only outside the prison hospitals. It has been reported that there are no

preventive health care measures for prisoners. In many cases disease spreads easily among the prisoners. The elderly or physically weak ones are most vulnerable.

As per TCHRD records since 1987, there have been 88 known deaths of Tibetan political prisoners as a direct result of torture. All of them died either while in Chinese custody or after release from prisons in a state of near death conditions, due to prolonged torture.

The torture method in prisons violates the United Nations Convention against Torture:

“China is a signatory to the United Nations Convention against Torture, and has submitted several periodic reports to the Committee Against Torture. There are regulations governing the conduct of Public Security Bureau and People’s Armed Police (PAP). Torture used to coerce confessions has reportedly been ‘prohibited’ in China since 1958. However, it remains commonplace. Few prisoners in Tibet escape torture and ill-treatment; it is particularly harsh during the early stages of custody and interrogation. Kidney and liver ailments are common among prisoners as a result of kicking and beatings by prison guards aimed specifically at these sensitive organs. Many prisoners are also beaten around the face and head. Many report being beaten with whatever implement a guard or interrogator can find at hand, such as a log, a gun butt or even in one case, a tire pump.”⁵⁴

“Other common forms of torture reported by prisoners are the use of electric shock batons, particularly on sensitive areas such as the mouth and genitals; being forced to stand in awkward positions for long periods and being suspended from the ceiling by their arms. Prisoners report being tied in agonizing positions with ropes and also being forced into awkward positions with the use of ankle cuffs, handcuffs and thumb cuffs. A great many prisoners suffer serious long-term physical and psychological effects from ill-treatment and torture in detention.”⁵⁵

According to briefing paper prepared by TCHRD for submission to the UN special rapporteur on torture prior to his June 2004 visit, the “Strike Hard” campaign had permeated the lives of Tibetans in Tibet whose only crime was to uphold to their conscience.

Given China’s record of torture and the continued use, it is clear that China commits acts of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment towards its people. In addition to well known forms of torture since the early 1990s the methods of torture have become less visible outwardly because the Chinese in Tibet have become aware of the forms of abuse that leave physical evidence difficult to deny. The use of prolonged forced physical exercise and labour are customary in prisons and detention centres regardless of the prisoner’s physical condition. Deprivation of food, water, and sleep are routinely used against political prisoners such as prolonged periods of solitary confinement and extended exposure to extreme temperatures. Acts intentionally committed to humiliate prisoners, including urinating in prisoners’ mouths and sexual assault of nuns have been reported.

In a letter dated 10 August 2000, the Special Rapporteur advised the Chinese Government that he continued to receive information according to which the use of torture and other forms of ill treatment, in particular in Tibet and in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is widespread. In that letter, and in addition to methods reported in previous years, he transmitted information on *‘the use of trained dogs to attack prisoners; the use of live electric wires to give electric shocks, inter alia, to the mouth and genitals; the insertion of sticks or needles under the nails or having fingernails pulled out with pliers; the hanging of prisoners from a rail with one foot and one hand for 24 hours; the shoving of paper into the anus of detained persons and the setting on fire of this paper.’* He transmitted further information on *‘prisoners being made to run in the “flying airplane” position, arms spread out and bent forward; having their hands tied behind their back and having them pulled up behind them, causing intense pain; and on prisoners being made to stand barefoot in the snow and having cold water poured over them in freezing winter temperatures.’*

Torture occurs primarily during arrests, in detention centres and prisons. Detainees have reported receiving initial beatings with whatever weapons are at hand including sticks, iron bars and plastic cords filled with sand. Kicking and punching are also reported. Suspects are held in police stations anywhere from a few hours to

weeks. Torture and other coercive measures are employed in order to obtain confessions and names of aides or foreign associates. In police stations, methods of torture include punching, kicking and beating with sticks having nails, dog attacks, electric shocks and sleep deprivation. In detention centres, Tibetans have been held for several years without a judicial adjudication; either through administrative sentencing or through prolonged periods of pre-trial detention that exceed the legal limit.

More sophisticated methods of torture are employed in detention centres indicating extensive training in methods designed to extract information. These methods include: the use of electric shocks applied to sensitive parts of the body including the genitals, anus, face, feet, mouth and breasts; the use of handcuffs, shackle or ropes to secure prisoners in positions intended to maximise pain; self-tightening cuffs designed to cut into the victim’s skin; prolonged periods of exposure to extreme temperatures; extended periods of solitary confinement; being made to adopt exhausting physical postures, including standing for hours on end; and beatings to the kidneys and genitals with a variety of instruments including sticks, iron bars and plastic cords filled with sand.

Once a sentence is passed (through judicial, administrative or other means), torture is employed through forced labour and exertion, extended periods of solitary confinement, lack of adequate food, denial of medical care, and forced blood and fluid extraction.

Refugees who are caught coming back from India or Nepal are reportedly treated much more harshly and receive longer sentences than those who are caught trying to leave Tibet, according to former inmates. Tibetans who have served sentences in the New Reception Centre or at Nyari prison in Shigatse report that most individuals caught at the border serve a prison sentence of three to five months, receive beatings and torture regularly (most commonly being hit with an electric baton), and must perform hard labour, usually road building in and around Shigatse.

Nyima and Nyidron’s testimonies on torture

Phenpo Podo Nunnery is a small nunnery in Phenpo Lhundup County, Lhasa Municipality, “TAR”, established by Geshe Podowa before the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1959. In its initial years, the nunnery housed around 200 nuns.

Nyima and Nyidron joined the nunnery in 1992 when there were 130 nuns. However, they couldn’t stay for long in the nunnery as both were arrested by Public Security Bureau officials for protesting against the Chinese government and were subsequently sentenced to five years imprisonment.

After their release from prison and escape to India, the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy met the nuns.

Nyima recounts, “In September 1993, the nuns at Podo Nunnery were called for a meeting at Sumpang Township by the local authorities. During the meeting, the authorities issued a directive whereby nuns below the age of 18 were banned from attending the nunnery and an enrolment ceiling of sixty nuns in the nunnery was imposed. Failing to follow the directive, the nunnery was threatened with imposition of heavy fines. Most of the nuns, out of the total 130 nuns in the nunnery, failed to meet the age regulation. A week later, an official notice was sent to the village head and accordingly Nyidron and I and other nuns below eighteen years of age were dismissed from the nunnery. Many elderly nuns were also expelled to meet the enrolment ceiling of sixty nuns.”

“The nuns were depressed and anxious about their fate. In order to protest the curtailment of religious rights, Nyidron and I, along with another nun, Nyichung, secretly crossed the hill separating Lhasa from Phenpo County on foot and reached Lhasa on the morning of 22 March 1999. Three of us straight away proceeded to the busy Barkhor market and shouted slogans calling for “Freedom in Tibet”, “ Chinese out of Tibet” and “Human Rights in Tibet”. Barkhor “PSB” officials immediately took us into custody and detained us for about fifteen minutes in the local Detention Centre. We were then shifted to Lhasa City PSB Detention Centre in the east of Lhasa and kept in separate cells for interrogation. A team of PSB officials was sent to the nunnery in Phenpo County to search for any incriminating evidence. The officers, on ransacking our quarters and other nuns quarters, found a pamphlet calling for Tibetan Independence in a neighbouring nun’s quarter. Suspecting a huge undercover protest, the three of us were beaten, had boiling water splashed on our bodies, were lashed with belts and our bodies were pricked with cigarette butts. In September 1994, Lhasa People’s Intermediate Court sentenced us to five years’ imprisonment term on charges of “counter revolutionary” activities. We continued to be detained in Gutsa Detention Centre for one year and five months. In August 1995, we were transferred to Drapchi Prison where a new unit for female political prisoners had been built which housed around sixty inmates. On reaching Drapchi Prison, we were made to perform exercise drills and study prison rules and regulations.”

Chapter 5

Sept 11 and “Strike Hard” Campaign

The tide and the scope of “Strike Hard” Campaign changed dramatically after the 9/11 and the subsequent ‘War on Terror’ campaign. A single event changed the entire world opinion on organizations who employed terror tactics to justify their freedom struggle.

Months later the controversial ‘pre-emption’ bill was passed in US Senate House to strike back on terror organizations without any provocation. The world of popular violent uprisings in Xinjiang was soon to undergo a major political shift by an event completely irrelevant to them.⁵⁶

“In the wake of the September 11 attacks on the United States, China has launched its own ‘war on terror.’ Beijing now labels as terrorists those who are fighting for an independent state in the northwestern province of Xinjiang, which the separatists call ‘Eastern Turkestan.’ The government considers these activists part of a network of international Islamic terror, with funding from the Middle East, training in Pakistan, and combat experience in Chechnya and Afghanistan.”

In the subsequent weeks after the Sept 11, the anti-separatist rhetoric was pitched up and grown increasingly vocal amongst the leadership in Beijing with the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhu Bangzhao claiming of proof linking Uighur freedom movement with the newly coined phrase “Bin Ladin clique”. In related to the rhetoric of anti-separatist two people were executed and many others sentenced to jail. To this political phenomenon, Dru Gladney, a Central Asia expert at the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies in Hawaii said, *“They [leadership in Beijing] want to take advantage of this situation and clean house”*.⁵⁷

However, there was a widespread international outcry on Beijing taking ‘Carte blanche’ on the ‘War on Terror’ said Turdi Ghoja, the president of the Washington based Uighur American Association “China.

wants to take advantage of the global war on terrorism to legitimize its indulgence in killing, torturing and imprisoning Uighurs”.⁵⁸ The scale of the repression of the Uighur minority drew the attention of many human rights watchdogs. During the initial stages the Pentagon snubbed Beijing for taking leverages of the US “War on Terror”. Later in October 2001, President Bush while visiting Shanghai for a regional summit warned the regime using anti-terror label to crackdown on minorities. In order to win the support of global countries for their war in Iraq US Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage visited China in mid 2003 and acceded a long-standing Chinese demand of US declaration of East Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM) as a “Terror Organization”.

In the history of Xinjiang people, perhaps the most popular uprising since the establishment of People’s Republic of China was in 1997. It was the period of violent bomb blast, political assassinations and protest against the Chinese authorities that too during the on-going “Strike Hard” campaign of 1996. The former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s response to the 1997 uprising indicates how the Chinese regime treats the Uighur people; Zhu ordered the local Chinese authorities “to use an iron fist against Uighur and other separatists (Tibetans).” This was followed by repressive measures against the Uighur people and for the first time many human rights watchdogs and the western media turned their attention to the remote western region of China. Not only did the local Chinese authorities curb the political dissidence but also control their religious institutions and mosque, which of late came under a severe crackdown and vigilance.

“As noted above, Xinjiang has seen periodic anti-government and separatist protests and government repression in response. The evidence is contradictory as to whether the PRC has taken advantage of the situation to intensify repression in the region since September 11. Amnesty International reports that “there has been an overall intensification of human-rights violations [in Xinjiang] and a crackdown on separatists”. More than 2500 suspected separatists have been detained, and Western media reports that not only activists but religious leaders are being targeted. There have been several accounts of executions of Uighurs for political crimes in the months after September 11.”

Particularly, the religious repression that began in 1990s in China in relation to banning of religious organization such as Falung Gong as a ‘Cult’. In Tibet also the “Patriotic Re-education” campaign was in full the swing. In Xinjiang there was a similar religious repression particularly after the Sept 11 event. Chien-peng chung an Assistant professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies says in his report in the aftermath of 9/11 developments in Xinjiang *“Also in the spring of 2001, Beijing mounted a “re-education campaign” for the imams who run state-controlled mosques across China, forcing 8,000 Muslim clerics through the propaganda program by the end of the year. Amnesty International also charges that the “subjective yardstick of ‘terrorism’ was used to detain some who may have done little more than practice their religion or defend their culture.”*⁵⁹.

Many observers have already discounted the claims of official propaganda saying that the protest and unrest in Xinjiang as ‘terrorist activities’. There was no ‘terrorism’ in Xinjiang but only few incidents of protest and violence that too was very spread out in few remote pockets. It has nothing to do with so called ‘Bin Ladin clique’ because the political protest were an inspiration from the central asian republics that achieved their independence from the dismembered Soviet Union. The official Chinese record speaks of few petty incidents that do not have features of ‘terror cells’ or ‘terror organizations’ claimed by the Beijing officials. The Chinese state media reported of having arrested over 200 hundred dissidents much before the September 11 attacks, indicating acts of wide spread unease in the region.

The ‘Pre-emption’ doctrine against defenseless people constitute the gross violations of human rights by the Chinese authorities. Technically the ‘pre-emption’ strike cannot be applied in the case of Tibet. There is no relationship between ‘terrorism’ and the ‘peaceful freedom struggle’ of Tibetan people. In the case of Tibet it is ‘not’ ‘Separatism’ but an expression and exercise of their fundamental human rights and freedom of their ‘conscience’. It is in this context Amnesty International deliberately termed most of Tibetan prisoners and arrestees as ‘prisoners of conscience’. The word ‘terrorism’ was used to legitimize the “Strike Hard” campaign in relation to the Sept 11 episode. Similarly Chinese authorities frequently use the term “state secrets” to justify severe and harsh crackdowns without elaborating on the meaning of the term “state secrets”. Hence on both fronts the

reasons cited for the “Strike Hard” Campaign was misleading and “inaccurate”. Therefore the “Strike Hard” Campaign was nothing more than an official attempt to suppress the nationalist sentiments in Tibet.

In the wake of Beslan terror siege in Russia, the world body’s condemnation of international terrorism was further resolute. In a similar fashion, China tried to highlight the terror threat with obvious reference to Xinjiang. It was yet another method of using the “War on Terror” and seeking world recognition of China too as a victim of domestic terrorism.

On 26th October, 2004 the “TAR” Vice Secretary and the head of “TAR” police department Yang Song convened a meeting for the “TAR” Party school. In the meeting Yang Sung stressed the importance of fighting resolutely against the “Dalai Clique” and the “separatist forces”. He also stressed the long time goal of achieving unification among the ethnic nationalities for creating one China. It was for the first time that the Chinese authorities openly acknowledged “Strike Hard” Campaign to be launched against “Dalai clique” and “separatist forces”. China had been getting out the campaign of crushing down all expressions of political dissidence in Tibet and Xinjiang under the cover of “Strike Hard”. It is but an attempt by the leadership in Beijing to exploit terror activities in other parts of the world to serve their political agendas resulting in serious human rights violations.

“Strike Hard” Campaign Continues

On 4 Nov 2004, China Tibet Information Center (www.tibetinfo.net) reported that the Lhasa authorities launched the “Yanda” [CH] or “Strike Hard” Campaign in Lhasa city between 1 Nov 2004 and 30 Dec 2004 and called it a “Clean Up” exercise. It has also been extended to seven other counties and one Municipality. The Chinese authorities called for the integrated co-operation among the various departments of public safety and law enforcement bodies such as “Public Security Bureau (PSB)”, “People’s Armed Police (PAP)”, “Riot Police”, “Traffic Police”, “Crime Branch” and “Fire Department”. The Campaign remains under the supervision of courts. These law enforcement bodies are specially assigned to act on the three major celebrations such as New Year, Tibetan New Year and Chinese New Year. The announcement of the “Strike Hard” Campaign yet again displays ‘Pre-emption’ tactics by the Chinese authorities against any kind of

activities or expressions that promoted political dissidence, loyalty to Dalai Lama and the display of his photo in homes. In other words this Campaign is launched to fight against few specified targets such as “splittist” or “Dalai Cliques”, “under ground activities”, “religious extremism”, “organized fugitives” and other “terrorist and subversive organizations”. The announcement of the campaign in itself undermined seriously the right to freedom of expression of the Tibetan people. With the latest launch of the campaign, Lhasa City authorities promised to create a far more congenial atmosphere of public safety security in Lhasa City, and a general social and political stability in Tibet.

A similar meeting on 31 October 2004, formally relaunched the “Patriotic Education” in monasteries and nunneries in Lhasa was formally opened according to *Lhasa Evening* on 1 November 2004. The head of the Committee for “Patriotic Education” in Lhasa, Lobsang Gyurmey said in his opening speech *“Patriotic education should be implemented to the fullest in the monasteries and nunneries and to prevent separatist activities. Precautionary measures should also be taken to stop the infiltration of literature from the splittist group based in exile”*

Officials from the United Front Work Department, Religious Bureau and State Law Enforcement bodies attended the workshop. The participant will implement the content of the workshop in two or three monasteries in the end of the year as a trial. It was announced that a successful trial will lead to city wide implementation in the next couple of years beginning from 2005.

The bend in the course of “Strike Hard” Campaign took place after the Sept 11 event. The Campaign that was hitherto launched to fight ‘crime’ is today bend for fighting an imaginary terrorism in Xinjiang and oppressing the peaceful Tibetans whose only crime is expressing their ‘conscience’. The political complexities China attached to the political dissent in Xinjiang were never received well by international bodies. However, it is widely believed today that the event of Sept 11 was a turning point in the “Strike Hard” campaign in Tibet and Xinjiang. Hence, there is no doubt that this “Strike Hard” Campaign is very significant and strategic from the point of view of Chinese authorities and could last for many more years.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The “Strike Hard” campaign in its twenty years of existence has seen different contours of implementation. Criticisms and controversies have surrounded the campaign in many ways. The Chinese society in general may have become healthier and safer but the campaign was never an ultimate solution to the crime. This is indicated in the three launch of the campaigns in 1983, 1996 and 2001. After each campaign there were a looming peak of crimes, this vindicated the fact that ‘deep rooted’ socio-economic problems had not been addressed in the society. It has been proved time and again that ‘inequity in economic income’ of the Chinese masses has been the chief factor for the rise of crimes started in early eighties and continues right through China’s fast economic growth.

The 1983 and 1996 campaigns lasted only for several months before they were withdrawn officially. The question remains to be answered whether the withdrawals meant success of the mission or were experiments by authorities to test public strength. The rhetoric attached to the campaign in the initial phase of the launch has now subsided but authorities have issued fresh notices to the campaign citing the recent Russian siege in Beslan, and the bombing of Australian embassy in Indonesia by suspected terrorist organizations. Nevertheless Beijing continues to see the relevance of “Strike Hard” campaign in today’s much-changed global geo-politics. However, in assessment on the ground, “Strike Hard” campaign did not bring a positive trend in the reversal of crime situations in China. This view is expressed by Amnesty International *“Further more, like other “Strike Hard” campaigns before it, this crackdown is unlikely to have a lasting impact on China’s growing crime problem and the Chinese government’s claim that its extensive use of the death penalty is needed to tackle the serious crime problem in China remains unconvincing.”*

The most notorious part of this campaign was the human rights abuse in Tibet and Xinjiang where the campaign was used to serve a political purpose. Many criticisms poured in on China’s branding of

Conclusion

the peaceful political expressions in Tibet and Xinjiang as ‘domestic terrorism’. Under this campaign many Tibetans and Uighurs were sent to prisons and some to death on the grounds of what Chinese authorities call ‘endangering state security’. The most deplorable part the campaign was that many of the legal norms were totally undermining the fairness of the trials and death penalties even for minor crimes. It is widely known that most of convicts were executed after brief summary trials. Caution on the campaign was even expressed by Xiao Yang the President of China’s Supreme Court, concerning the fair trial and proper measures regarding the judicial procedures. Xiao warned, “*Still even with the crackdown the court must handle these cases carefully*”. The issue of ‘death penalty’ under the campaign remained a most contentious issue. Many rights group have asked Chinese officials to withdraw it or at least use it only in extreme cases.

The “Strike Hard” campaign has other dimensions in analyzing the campaign’s special status in Tibet. In 1983 the campaign was targeted against crimes. However, the campaigns of 1996 though officially withdrawn on July 1996 remained in practice in Tibet under the cover of “Patriotic Re-education” campaign. As per findings of TCHRD - 11,383 monks and nuns have been expelled from Tibet in last nine years by so called “work teams” under the campaign. Those monks and nuns who resisted the political education of “work teams” were dealt with similar crackdowns of “Strike Hard” campaign. In practice “Strike Hard” campaign remained in Tibet regardless of the third re-launch in 2001. Suppressing the political dissent in Tibet was pursued under the cover of “Patriotic Re-education” and “Anti-Dalai” campaigns. In 2001 the campaign received a new impetus after the Sept 11 events in dealing against the political dissent both in Tibet and in Xinjiang.

In Tibet the “Strike Hard” campaign of 2001 continues. The campaign was announced by Jiang Zemin during his reign and it is quite unlikely for the new leadership particularly Hu Jintao to withdraw it.

In *real politik* the relevance of “Strike Hard” campaign is assured as long as Tibet and Xinjiang’s problem remained unresolved. In post Sept 11 era “Strike Hard” campaign has a special legitimacy and it will remain Beijing’s handy tool in suppressing political dissidence in long years to come.

Recommendations

1. An immediate withdrawal of the “Strike Hard” campaign and the total abolition of ‘death penalty’.
2. The Chinese government withdraw “patriotic re-education” campaign in Tibet and allow freedom of expression of religion in Tibet.
3. The Chinese government to follow international norms in dealing with both political and criminal prisoners.
4. An immediate moratorium on the execution of Trulku Tenzin Delek Rinpoche and his early release.
5. Immediate release of Gendun Choekyi Nyima the 11th Panchen Lama.
6. Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) must be repealed and also executions after ‘summary trials’ must be abolished.
7. Law enforcement bodies’ highhandedness be curbed, held accountable and court of law for action violating the basic fundamental human rights.
8. Create a reliable and fair and independent Judiciary system that functions without the governmental interference.

Appendix

Xinjiang: A Restless Islamic “New Frontier”

The present day Xinjiang was formerly the lost territory of the then ‘Ottoman Empire’, mostly the Turks. However, they call themselves as ‘East Turkistan’. During the declining years of Ottoman Empire the eastern part of the empire was annexed by the rulers of Qing dynasty of China in 1759. The first incident of protest for independence can be traced back to an uprising led by a local chieftain named Yakub Beg in 1865. He launched many fierce battles against the armies of the Imperial court with relative success which resulted in securing in return trade concessions, diplomatic recognition from Tsarist Russia and the United Kingdom. Though he was eventually defeated in 1877 but Beg’s rebellious campaigns sown the seed of Uighur people calling for independence based on their distinct religion and ethnicity. When China’s imperial rule ended in 1911 and the period of three decades of Civil Wars, the Uighurs in collusion with the local Muslim groups achieved brief independence from 1931-1934 and again from 1944-1949. They call themselves as East Turkestan Republic whose government was set up in Xinjiang. The first government was set up in the city of Hami however local warlord crushed it later.

“Xinjiang” in Mandarin means ‘new frontier’ indicating a distant territory until the communist China occupied it in 1949 (on the pretext to liberate them) and since then became a renegade region under Mao’s China. Today the province is under the rule of People’s Republic of China and has an estimated population of eight million Uighurs. Though they speak their own language but the national language is Mandarin. Still today they live in medieval mud-brick houses in crowded neighborhoods while Chinese immigrants mostly Hans live in well built white-tile blocks. Uighurs patronize their own eateries and they don’t have Chinese clients and rarely inter marriages.

Demographically speaking, around 40% of Xinjiang’s twenty million people are Han Chinese compared to 4% to 5% in 1949. Some experts say that it may be now 60%-65% Han Chinese if police and

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army troops are added along with the Han settlers. It is no surprise that heavy troops are there to stay and the Han settlers are dominating the land and economic developments. In recent years there were several separatist outbreaks among which the most noted ones were in 1996 and 1997 when bomb blasts rocked the provincial capital Urumqi.

In today’s geo-politics, Xinjiang is in fact a strategic region. Since after the dismemberment of Soviet Union, China faces a new political reality. In recent times United States has established military bases in republics like Kazakhstan, which China sees as potential threat to their national security. It is also China’s fear of their perceived encirclement by US or so-called containment of China. China already has a heavy presence of troops in Xinjiang and with the setting up of US base in neighboring Asian republics would further increase the deployment of troops by China. It is also a crucial battleground for China to secure oil pipeline from Kazakhstan so that it will ease China’s oil dependence on the Gulf countries where United States is a key player in the region. From every aspect this remote renegade region is a sensitive card for China and therefore she would do everything to keep the region under their ‘iron fist’ and this is the reason why the “Strike Hard” Campaign was launched here in 2001 and received a new impetus after September 11.

Appendix

List of known expulsions from monasteries and nunneries in Tibet under the “Patriotic Re-education” Campaign from January 1996-August 2004.

Date	Number of Monks/Nuns	Names	Monastery/Other	(Human Rights Update Issue)
July 29, 2003	800 (Approx)		Ngaba Kirti Monastic School	Sep 2003 Update
June 18, 1905	30		Sera Monastery	Aug 2003 Update
May, 2002	17		Hermitage, Chaksam Chori	Feb 2003 Update
January, 2001	1	Jampel Gyatso	Sera Monastery	Oct 2003 Update
March, 2001	1	Tendar	Sera Monastery	Oct 2003 Update
1999	1	Gonpo	Tawu Monastery	Sep2001 Update
Mid 2000	300		Tsalpo Nunnery	Sep 2001 Update
March, 2001	6	Sey Khedup Tenzin Choewang Tsering Lhagon Yeshe Tenzin Trakru Yeshe Gyurmey	Sog Tsendhen Monastery	Sep 2001 Update
April 18, 2001	3000 (Approx)		Serthar Buddhist Institute in Karze	July 2001 Update
Early 2001	20		Drakar Nunnery	July 2001 Update
December, 2000	4	Jigme, Toema, Khedrup and Kelsang.	Tsenyi Monastery	July 2001 Update
May, 1997	3	Ngawang Nyima Tsering Nyima Gonpo Gyaltzen	Bhugon Monastery	July 2001 Update
October, 1999	1	Lobsang Sherab	Sera Monastery	Feb 2001 Update
11 May, 1996	4	Acho (aka Ngawang Thupten) Kunga, Urgen Dorjee and Jamyang	Phugon Monastery	Feb 2001 Update
11 May, 1996	3		Konpon Monastery	Feb 2001 Update
22 July, 2004	1	Choeden Rigzin	Gaden Monastery	March 2004 Update
3 March, 1996	3	Lobsang Tharchin Lobsang Tenkyong and Lobsang Choejor	Rabten Monastery	Feb 2004 Update
Mid Jan, 2003	5		Khangmar Monastery	Feb 2004 Update
June 15, 1905	1	Luzi Tashi Phuntsok	Jamyong Choekorling Monastery (aka Othok monastery)	Oct 2003 Update
Feb, 2002	1	Yeshe Tsultrim	Ramed Monastery	Sep 2003 Update
11, April 2003	2	Kunchok Choephel Labrang & Jigme Jamtruk.	Labrang Tashikyil Monastery	Aug 2003 Update
June 19, 1905	10		Yoetri Monastery	Aug 2003 Update
16 August, 1997	1	Gylajing (layname Lobsang Tsering)	Pomda Monastery	Nov 2001 Update
July, 1998	15		Lora Monastery	Dec 2000 Update
Mid, 2000	20		Tholey Monastery	Nov 2000 Update
June 20, 1995	140		Pashoe Monastery	Oct 2000 Update
May, 2000	130		Nag Nunnery	Oct 2000 Update

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Date	Number of Monks/Nuns	Names	Monastery/Other	Source (Human Rights Update Issue)
May, 1996	12	Lobsang Palden, Pulupa (nickname), Sonam Tenpa, Ngawang Kalsang, Tsering Badro, Phurbu Tsering, Badro, Penpa, Tenzin Yeshe and Tsultrim Gyaltsen.	Gaden Monastery	April 2001 Update
1998	20		Tramtson Monastery	March 2001 Update
1998	18		Druka Monastery	March 2001 Update
1999	500		Chamdo Monastery	May 2000 Update
1996	50		Shugang Monastery	Sep 2000 Update
June, 1998	15		Yungtrung Peri Monastery	Aug 2000 Update
15 July, 2000	30		Tsuklhakhang (central cathedral)	July 2000 Update
13 Nov, 1999	60		A-Kyong Monastery	July 2000 Update
June, 1998	6	Phurbu, Jangchup Dakpa and Khedup Phakchok. The 3 expelled monks remain unnamed.	Dozong Monastery	July 2000 Update
March, 1997	17		Gangchen Monastery	June 2000 Update
1999	25		Dzogang Monastery	June 2000 Update
7 June, 1999	1	Tashi Sangpo	Dzogang Monastery	June 2000 Update
17 May, 2000	8		Reting Monastery	May 2000 Update
June, 1998	60		Kandze Monastery	May 2000 Update
March, 1997	1	Tadhon	Lura Monastery	April 2000 Update
May, 1998	100		Dhungar Monastery	April 2000 Update
September, 1997	48		Woeser Monastery	April 2000 Update
25 Sept, 1997	83		Rakor Nunnery	April 2000 Update
7 October, 1999	2	Chemi Lobsang Chakdor Lobsang	Drayab Monastery	March 2000 Update
August, 1997	15	Including Tinley Tenzin	Pomda Monastery	March 2000 Update
August, 1997	1	Lobsang Nyima	Pomda Monastery	March 2000 Update
October, 1997	1	Gedun Gyatso	Pomda Monastery	March 2000 Update

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List of known expulsions from monasteries and nunneries in Tibet under the “Patriotic Re-education” Campaign from January 1996-August 2004.

Date	Number of Monks/Nuns	Names	Monastery/Other	Source (Human Rights Update Issue)
March, 1998	30		Gonlung Nunnery	March 2000 Update
March, 1998	6	Lama Kushab Sikpa, Phuntsok Dhargyal, Thinlay Tsondue, Lobsang Tsondue, Jamyan Sangye	Reting Monastery	Feb 2000 Update
June, 1998	49		Reting Monastery	Feb 2000 Update
June, 1998	60		Gonlung Nunnery	Jan 2000 Update
12, August 1998	206		Nyizong and Dolma Lhakhang Monastery	Jan 2000 Update
May, 1998	60		Sanglung Monastery	Jan 2000 Update
March, 1998	12		Wara Monastery	Jan 2000 Update
July, 1998	1	Lobsang Lhundup	Sog Tsendhen Monastery	Jan 2000 Update
May, 1996	48		Driru Monastery	Jan 2000 Update
May, 1998	31		Drongnag Monastery	Jan 2000 Update
May, 1998	25		Lodrong Nunnery	Jan 2000 Update
October, 1998	3	Sonam Phuntsok, Sonam Choephel and Agya Tsering	Karze Dhargye Monastery	Nov 1999 Update
12 June, 1996	1	Gyaltsen Thokmey	Sera Monastery	Nov 1999 Update
1997	30		Photrang Monastery	Nov 1999 Update
November, 1998	10		Dechen Monastery	Nov 1999 Update
April, 1999	2	Dakpa Gyaltsen and Sangye Tashi	Rong-Gonchen Monastery	Oct 1999 Update
10 October, 1999	25		Rong-Gonchen Monastery	Oct 1999 Update
31 May, 1999	3		Namo Monastery	Oct 1999 Update
	30		Taklungdrag Monastery	Oct 1999 Update
20 August, 1999	1	Ngawang Tsedup	Taklungdrag Monastery	Oct 1999 Update
24 October, 1999	1	Geshe Sonam Phuntsok	Karze Dhargye Monastery	Oct 1999 Update
8 October, 1999	22		Nye-rong Monastery	Oct 1999 Update

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List of known expulsions from monasteries and nunneries in Tibet under the “Patriotic Re-education” Campaign from January 1996-August 2004.

Date	Number of Monks/Nuns	Names	Monastery/Other	Source (Human Rights Update Issue)
August, 1999	4		Samo Monastery	Oct 1999 Update
September, 1998	10		Sa-Ngag Dechen Monastery	Oct 1999 Update
April, 1999	1	Lobsang Kunchok	Kirti Monastery	Sep 1999 Update
16 June, 1999	3		Drepung Monastery	Sep 1999 Update
20 July, 1999	11		Karze Monastery	Sep 1999 Update
July, 1998	4		Tawu Nyitso Monastery	Sep 1999 Update
July, 1998	200		Khyung Monastery	July, 1999 Update
August, 1998	20		Gonsar Monastery	July, 1999 Update
10 March, 1999	2	Phuntsok Legmon and Namdol	Taglungdrag Monastery	July, 1999 Update
Feb, 1999	4		Sera Monastery	July, 1999 Update
July, 1998	14		Lama Dechen Monastery	July, 1999 Update
July, 1997	22		Pekarthong Monastery	June, 1999 Update
May, 1996	2	Bhutuk and Ngodup	Drongtso Monastery	June, 1999 Update
June, 1998	7		Tsang Monastery	May, 1999 Update
April, 1999	1	Ngawang Samphel	Drepung Monastery	May, 1999 Update
December, 1998	140		Drongu Monastery	April, 1999 Update
September, 1998	4		Drayab Monastery	May, 1999 Update
September, 1998	16		Drupdre Monastery	May, 1999 Update
July, 1998	14		Reting Samtenling Nunnery	Feb, 1999 Update
April, 1998	240		Khanang Tso Monastery	Jan, 1999 Update
Feb, 1996	1	Sangpo Gyaltzen	Mon Drup Choy De Monastery	Jan 1999 Update
Feb, 1997	8		Meeru Monastery	Jan 1999 Update
Feb, 1998	1	Kunchok Chodon	Drakyerpa hermitage	Dec 1998 Update
	1	Tenzin Tsedup	Taktse Phagmo Monastery	Aug 1998 Update
	1	Thupten Tenzin	Thekchen Jangchup Choeling Monastery	June 1998 Update
	1	Senior monk	Rongpo Rabten Monastery	May 1998 Update
Jan, 1998	1	Gyalchoe	Padha Monastery	May 1998 Update

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Feb, 1998	6		Serpa Monastery	Jan 1998 Update
	1	Tenpa Rabgyal	Tashi-ge-Kunphel Ling Monastery	1998 Publication
	4		Rongpo Rabten Monastery	June 1998 Update
March, 1998	1	Rinzin Gyurmey Thupten Gyatso	Drigong Sha Lhagang	Sept 1998 Update
March, 1998	5	Choephel, Phakchog Dupa, Gyaltsen	Namtso Hermitage	Aug 1998 Update
March, 1998	4		Drakyap Monastery	July 1998 Update
10 March, 1998	15		Nagchu Sog County.	July 1998 Update
April, 1998	1	Tenzin Tsultrim	Phakmo Monastery	March 2002 Update
May, 1998	2	Samdrup and Ngawang Tenrab	Drepung Monastery	May 1998 Update
June, 1998	18		Tashi Choeling Monastery	Sept 1998 Update
August, 1998	2	Jampa Tenzin and Ngawang Tsultrim	Rongpo Rabten Monastery	Dec 1998 Update
November, 1998	6	Lobsang Sherab, Lopel, Palko, Tingzin, Tenzin and Palden	Kirti Monastery	May 1999 Update
May, 1998	2	Ngawang Tenrab and Samdup	Drepung Monastery	Dec 1998 Update
December, 1996	1	Kelsang	Gyalste Pe-choy Monastery	Dec 1998 Update
December, 1996	1	Migmar Dhondup	Gyalste Pe-choy Monastery	Dec 1998 Update
December, 1997	14		Rongpo Rabten Monastery	June 1998 Update
February, 1998	4	Tenzin Lobsang, Gyaltsen Tsultrim, Tenzin Tsultrim and Gedun Tharchin	Rongpo Rabten Monastery	1998 Publication "Crackdown on Humanity"
February, 1998	2	Ngawang Tsultrim and Jampa Tenzin	Rongpo Rabten Monastery	June 1998 Update
February, 1996	1	Ka Bukey	Nubsur Monastery	Nov 1998 Update
February, 1998	109		Drakyerpa hermitage	Nov 1998 Update
7 March, 1998	500		Drigong Sha Lhagang	Sept 1998 Update
March, 1998	2100		Lhabrang Tashi Kyil Monastery	Sept 1998 Update
1997	3		Rabten Monastery	
1997	100		Sog Tsendhen Monastery	Sept 1998 Update

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Date	Number of Monks/Nuns	Names	Monastery/Other	Source (Human Rights Update Issue)
1998	30		Kumbum Jonag Monastery	Sept 1998 Update
June, 1998	100		Tashi Choeling Monastery	Sept 1998 Update
August, 1997	23		Toerong Nunnery	Aug 1998 Update
20 March, 1996	1	Migmar Gyaltsen	Toeshung Choephel Monastery	Aug 1998 Update
1997	13		Lhoka Samye Chee Gu Lhakhang Ser Po Nunnery	Aug 1998 Update
April, 1997	3		Drakyap Monastery	July 1998 Update
May, 1998	4		Rongpo Rabten and Chamdo Dozong Monastery	July 1998 Update
February, 1998	6		Serpo Monastery	July 1998 Update
December, 1996	30		Thekchen Jangchup Monastery	June 1998 Update
August, 1997	6		Pomda Monastery	May 1998 Update
November, 1997	16		Pomda Monastery	May 1998 Update
February, 1997	20		Chang Ta Lung Monastery	May 1998 Update
1997	74		Neykar Nunnery	May 1998 Update
June, 1997	1	Gedun Kaisang	Golok Rakya Monastery	May 1998 Update
June, 1997	27		Sakya Monastery	May 1998 Update
September, 1997	19		Pangsa Monastery	Feb 1998 Update
August, 1997	4	Namgyal Soepa, Ngawang Gyaser, Choeying Jampel and Serpa Soechoe.	Sog Tsendhen Monastery	Jan 1998 Update
29 June, 1996	15		Gangen Choekor Monastery	Jan 1997 Update
January, 1997	5	Gonpo, Chimey Lobsang, Ngawang, Tashi Namgyal and Shadok.	Drayab Magon	Sept 1997 Update
January, 1997	2	Yeshe Palmo and Tenzin Yeshe		31 Dec 1997 Update
February, 1997	20		Lhoka Choenkye County Nunnery	Dec 1997 Update
February, 1997	2	Inchung and Tsering	Toelung Dechen Nunnery	Dec 1997 Update
February, 1997	4		Shabten Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
March, 1997	1	Ngawang Choekyi	Sa Ngag Simbuk Nunnery	Dec 1997 Update
March, 1997	5		Gomar Monastery	July 1997 Update
March, 1997	3	Gedun Dondrup, Dakpa Gyaltsen and Gedun Ngodup	Rebkong Monastery	July 1997 Update
May, 1997	1	Chungdak	Lhunpo Monastery	July 1997 Update
May, 1997	1	Gurmey Dorjee	Dhargye Choeling Monastery	Dec 1997 Update

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Date	Number of Monks/Nuns	Names	Monastery/Other	Source (Human Rights Update Issue)
June, 1997	4		Rongpo Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
June, 1997	1	Abhum Lhundrupof	Lithang Monastery	May 1999 Update
June, 1997	4		Sog Tsendhen Monastery	Aug 2000 Update
June, 1997	1	Jampel Tendar	Gongkar Choede Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
June, 1997	2	Tsering Tashi and Yidhi	La Monastery in Lapa	Nov 1997 Update
July, 1997	7		Serwa Monastery	Oct 1997 Update
July, 1997	1	Rinzin Dhondup	Serwa Monastery	Oct 1997 Update
August, 1997	4		Sera Monastery	Dec 1996 Update
1997	3	Dechen, Yeshe Samten and Lobsang Tsering	Yada Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
March, 1997	3		Rame Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
May, 1997	70		Sungrabling Monastery	Update
1997	4		Namrab Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
1997	1	Khedrup	Gongkar Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
1997	2		Gonpa Phug Nunnery	Dec 1997 Update
December, 1996	330		Drayab Monastery	July 1998 Update
March, 1997	3	Gedun Dhondup, Gedun Dhonup (jnr) and Dakpa Gyaltsen	Rebkong Monastery	July 1997 Update
November, 1996	100		Tertum Nunnery in Meldro County	30 June 1997 Update
July, 1996	1	Bhagzo	Chokla Monastery	Feb 1997 Update
January, 1996	3	Lobsang Tharchin, Lobsang Tenchong and Lobsang Tenchong	Rapten Monastery	Jan 1997 Update 15 Jan 1997 Update
May, 1996	75		Lhatse Monastery	Update
January, 1996	9		Palgon Chorten Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
January, 1996	1		Shigatse Monastery	Dec 1998 Update
March, 1996	1	Jamyang Tsultrim	Amdo Monastery	Dec 1996 Update
May, 1996	90		Ganden Monastery	Dec 1996 Update
June, 1996	1	Lobsang Jamyang	Kirti Monastery	Dec 1996 Update
June, 1996	4	Namdol Choesang, Phuntsok, Yangdrol and Pema	Lhasa Tsang Khung Nunnery	Nov 1996 Update
July, 1996	4	Phuntsok Youdrun, Thinley Yangkyi, Nyuida Wangmo and another who's name is unknown.	Chubsang Nunnery	Nov 1996 Update
July, 1996	7		Karze Monastery	Dec 1996 Update

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Date	Number of Monks/Nuns	Names	Monastery/Other	(Human Rights Update Issue)
July, 1996	1	Lama Jigme Sangpo	Golok Sethar Nubsur Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
July, 1996	8		Garu Nunnery	May 1999 Update
July, 1996	4		Sera Monastery	Aug 2000 Update
August, 1996	1	Gendun Gyaltzen	Sakya Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
August, 1996	13		Drepung Monastery	Nov 1997 Update
September, 1996	1	Lenchok Tenphel	Sera Monastery	Oct 1997 Update
December, 1996	1	Lhundup Palden	Ganden Choedker Monastery	Oct 1997 Update
May, 1996	100		Kumbum Monastery	Dec 1996 Update
July, 1996	1	Rev Palden Dhondup	Chubsang Nunnery	Dec 1997 Update
August, 1996	152		Ganden Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
November, 1996	1	Tsultrim Gyaltzen	Dunbhu Choekhor Monastery	March 1999 Update
August, 1996	1		Sakya Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
18 November, 1996	18		Sera Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
March, 1996	25		Kumbum Monastery	Dec 1997 Update
TOTAL EXPULSIONS SINCE 1996	11,383			July 1998 Update

Note: Due to lack of space long list of names are not given, others due to lack of detail information

Endnotes

1. Chinese Laws
2. Mao's famous saying: "Power comes from the barrel of gun" (referring to seize power through war)
3. Patriarch of post Mao China the architect of China's phenomenal economic growth and his liberal policies on Tibet.
His famous dictum: " Except independence anything can be discussed"
4. People's Daily 04/06/2001 (www.china.org.cn/english/10437.htm)
5. www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/china/china96/womb6.htm
6. Ibid
7. Ibid
8. Ibid
9. www.china.org.cn/english/10437.htm
10. www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/china/china96/womb6.htm
11. Xinhua News Agency, cited by Reuters 30 June 1996
12. www.amnesty.org/ailib/china/china96/womb6.htm
13. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27768.htm>
14. A frenzy revolution (1966-1976) launch against so called 'old habits and ways' of feudal past, and Mao's four olds. Tibet lost almost all of her monasteries and heritage during this revolution though destruction started before it. It was actually a power struggle within the party hierarchy.
15. www.china.org.cn/english/10437.htm
16. www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/china/china96/womb6.htm
17. People's Daily 04/06/2001 (www.china.org.cn/english/10437.htm)
18. www.tibetinfo.net/news-updates/nu270601.htm
19. www.china.org.cn/english/10437.htm
20. Ibid

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21. Ibid
22. www.amnestyusa.org/countries/china/china-report09032001.html
23. Ibid
24. Amnesty International, Press release, dated 7.6.2001
25. www.amnestyusa.org/countries/china/china-report09032001.html
26. Ibid
27. www.web.amnesty.org/web/wire.nsf/september2001/china
28. Ibid
29. US State Department Country report, <http://www.crimenews2000.com/archives/01062808.html>
30. Kurt Samson
31. Laogai foundation reports
32. Kurt Samson Laogai foundation reports, www.laogai.org/reports/criminal.htm
33. Ibid
34. Ibid
35. Ibid
36. TIN 2001 No. 30 pg [76]
37. Ibid
38. [www.guchusum.org/Tibetan Envoy/ strike_hard.html](http://www.guchusum.org/Tibetan%20Envoy/strike_hard.html)
39. Ibid
40. Ibid
41. Ibid
42. Ibid
43. Ibid
44. Ibid
45. Ibid
46. Ibid
47. Ibid
48. Ibid

49. www.tibetinfo.net/news-updates/nu270601.htm
50. Ibid
51. TCHRD, www.tchrd.org/press/pr2001/0516.html
52. <http://www.tchrd.org/press/1998/pr19980401.html>
53. TIN report 2002
54. <http://www.tchrd.org/press/1998/pr19980401.html>
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